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Secret Conviction Programs
Meghan J. Ryan*
Abstract
Judges and juries across the country are convicting criminal
defendants based on secret evidence. Although defendants have
sought access to the details of this evidence—the results of computer
programs and their underlying algorithms and source
codes—judges have generally denied their requests. Instead, judges
have prioritized the business interests of the for-profit companies
that developed these “conviction programs” and which could lose
market share if the secret algorithms and source codes on which the
programs are based were exposed. This decision has jeopardized
criminal defendants’ constitutional rights.
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I. Introduction
Across the country, judges and juries are convicting
defendants based on secret evidence. Prosecutors regularly present
expert testimony on breathalyzer results, fingerprint matches, and
DNA matches, but courts have generally not allowed defendants to
scrutinize how the prosecutions’ testifying experts produced this
evidence. 1 In fact, these experts likely do not themselves know how
the results of their tests were reached. 2 That is because much of
this complicated, “scientific” evidence is generated by computer
programs—“conviction programs”—built on secret algorithms and
source codes developed in many instances by for-profit companies. 3
These companies refuse to reveal their secret formulas because
they understandably do not want copycat companies to purloin
1.
2.
3.

See infra Parts III–IV.
See infra Parts III–IV.
See infra Part IV.C.
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their market shares. 4 While judges, lawyers, and jurors generally
trust conviction programs’ results as rooted in science, in truth
there are real questions about the accuracy of the results these
programs produce. 5 Because the programs’ underlying algorithms
and source codes are held as company secrets, there is generally
little opportunity to sufficiently test the validity of their outputs. 6
Even without access to the nuances of conviction programs,
there is some evidence that these programs do not produce reliable
evidence. In New York alone, thousands of convictions have been
rooted in complex statistical analyses of DNA evidence that has
since been seriously questioned. 7 When a court recently granted
limited access to the source code of a conviction program used in
these cases, an independent data analyst found that the program,
which purported to accurately assess the likelihood that a
defendant’s DNA was found in a mixture of various individuals’
DNA, was deficient; it excluded several variables that would be
important to reach an accurate conclusion on this point. 8 This is
incredibly troubling. In one case, when experts used competing
conviction programs of complex statistical DNA analysis to assess
the probability that a defendant was at the scene of the crime, each
program produced a different result. 9 One indicated a likely DNA
match and thus likely presence at the scene, whereas the other
indicated that a match was unlikely and thus it was improbable
that the defendant was at the crime scene. 10
4. See infra Part IV.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part IV.
7. See Lauren Kirchner, Thousands of Criminal Cases in New York Relied
on Disputed DNA Testing Techniques, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 4, 2017, 6:00 PM),
https://perma.cc/7ZAZ-V4MQ (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (“Over the past decade,
the DNA laboratory in the office of New York City’s chief medical examiner
emerged as a pioneer in analyzing the most complicated evidence from crime
scenes. . . . Now these DNA analysis methods are under the microscope, with
scientists questioning their validity.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
8. Id.
9. See Seth Augenstein, Subjective DNA Mixture Analysis, Used in
Thousands of Cases, Blasted by WH Panel, FORENSIC MAG. (Sept. 8, 2016, 12:37
PM), https://perma.cc/XZY3-ZAPB (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See id. (“TrueAllele found the various DNA mixtures at the crime scene
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Some commentators have criticized criminal justice actors’
reliance on computer programs in setting bail and sentences, and
in determining when to grant an offender parole. 11 But
commentators have not been as vocal about the dangers associated
with police officers and prosecutors relying on computer programs
as investigatory tools and, more troublingly, as evidence for
conviction. 12 Yet even more is at stake—a defendant’s liberty or
even his life—where conviction programs are involved. This
happens when, for example, juries convict defendants based on the
results of breathalyzer tests, police officers and fingerprint
examiners rely on automated fingerprint identification systems
(AFISs), and DNA analysts depend on programs like TrueAllele or
STRmix for DNA matches. 13 In the context of assessing guilt, the
accuracy of the programs on which the criminal justice system
relies is critical.
Within the criminal justice system, the primary methods of
ensuring the accuracy of evidence are by assessing the “reliability”
of the information to determine whether it is admissible at trial
and through adversarial testing—in the crucible of
cross-examination—at trial. 14 Today, neither of these tools is truly
available to criminal defendants inculpated by these programs
aimed at conviction. Ordinarily, the algorithms and source codes
on which these conviction tools are based are not made available
to defendants. 15 Instead, the businesses responsible for creating
the complicated algorithms, and the source codes implementing
could not place Hillary there, while the prosecution was relying on a STRmix
interpretation of fingernail scrapings that indicated he was there.”).
11. See infra Part II; see also, e.g., Rebecca Wexler, When a Computer
Program Keeps You in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://perma.cc/K368QG93 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (“Technological advancement is, in theory, a
welcome development. But in practice, aspects of automation are making the
justice system less fair for criminal defendants.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part III.
14. Cf. Meghan J. Ryan, Escaping the Fingerprint Crisis: A Blueprint for
Essential Research, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (on file with author)
(“Beyond cross-examination, the defense often is unable to present its own
evidence about the inaccuracies and unreliability of fingerprint evidence.”).
15. See infra Part IV.
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them, are kept secret in the name of the producing companies’
business interests and based on the assumed accuracy of the
programs. 16 This prevents criminal defendants facing conviction
by computer algorithm and source code from mounting potentially
viable defenses based on these secrets.
At least some level of transparency is necessary to probe the
important questions tied up with using computer programs to
convict criminal defendants. Without access to the details of the
algorithms and source codes, actors within the criminal justice
system cannot clearly discern the accuracy of these programs and
the extent to which improper factors contribute to their outputs. 17
Simply trusting the creators of these programs cannot
suffice—especially where the creators are for-profit businesses and
especially where defendants’ liberties and lives are on the line.
The persistence of questionable convictions based on
purported “scientific” evidence stems from lawyers’ blind faith in
science and, relatedly, courts’ refusal to allow investigation into
the validity of these conviction programs. 18 Generally, judges and
lawyers do not seem to be exceptionally troubled by the secret
nature of the evidence used to convict criminal defendants. 19 As in
other areas where evidence has been labeled as science-based, the
criminal justice system has often given experts in this arena a free
pass. Certainly, science has its allure. It can offer an objective
approach to decisionmaking, and, when linked with the impressive
power of computing, it can survey a broad array of data in a
significantly more cost-effective and reliable way than humans
alone can ordinarily accomplish. 20 But those not familiar with
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.C; see also NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND LAW PROCEEDINGS 7 (April 15–16, 1999),
https://perma.cc/X46M-LV8Y (PDF) (“[L]awyers would like to see science, when it
is used in the courtroom, if not infallible, at least mostly accurate, mostly
immutable, and certain. That is the very factor that, in the legal mind, makes the
evidence also ‘reliable.’”).
19. But see infra Part III.B (discussing challenges to the admissibility of
DNA evidence reached through analyses based on TrueAllele and STRmix
computer programs).
20. See Lance Whitney, Are Computers Already Smarter Than Humans?,
TIME (Sept. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/DA9E-ZMXS (last visited Oct. 27, 2019)
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these disciplines, including lawyers, often over-hype science and
technology. 21 These disciplines are not a panacea. 22 Human error
is often built into these fields, and the powers of science and
technology have their limits. 23 By venerating these disciplines,
lawyers risk surrendering one of their most valuable assets:
skepticism.
More than of just general concern, the secrecy shrouding the
algorithms and source codes leading to defendant convictions is of
constitutional proportions. 24 It strikes at the heart of a defendant’s
due process right to have a meaningful opportunity to make a full
defense. 25 Without the necessary information about the evidence
that is being used to convict him, a defendant is denied the
opportunity to properly challenge this evidence. 26 Further, the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right loses its
meaning when the expert testifying to the results of a breathalyzer
test, fingerprint match, or DNA analysis does not fully understand
the nuances of how the conviction program computed the results
used as evidence against the defendant. 27 Because the police officer
testifying about a breathalyzer result ordinarily is not familiar
(“Computers can take in and process certain kinds of information much faster
than we can. They can swirl that data around in their ‘brains,’ made of processors,
and perform calculations to conjure multiple scenarios at superhuman speeds.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
21. See infra Part IV.C; see also Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom,
26 VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 724 (1992) (“Lawyers may seize upon a researcher’s first
expression of concern, and give it much import, even as later developments fail to
support the concern.”).
22. Cf. Huber, supra note 21, at 739 (conceding that “the views of the
establishment are sometimes wrong, in science and medicine as in law” and
noting that “Galileo gained fame by challenging one orthodoxy but eventually
became part of another: he refused to believe that the moon caused tides, or that
planets moved in ellipses”).
23. See id. at 724–29.
24. See infra Part V (explaining how withholding such relevant evidence
from the defense raises serious due process and confrontation issues).
25. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (stating that the
Due Process Clause guarantees a defendant the opportunity to make a complete
defense at trial); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (“The right of
an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair
opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.”).
26. See infra Parts IV–V.
27. See infra Part V.
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with the underlying algorithm and source code, for example, a full
examination about the accuracy of the result is impossible. 28 The
officer will not be able to explain how the breathalyzer transformed
the defendant’s breath into a 0.10 reading as a machine estimate
of the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration. 29 Similarly, even a
DNA analyst on the stand will ordinarily lack sufficient knowledge
about a computer program such as TrueAllele or STRmix so that
defense counsel can effectively use cross-examination to fully probe
the reliability of evidence produced by these programs. 30 And a
fingerprint examiner lacks the necessary expertise of the
underlying algorithms and source codes of AFISs to be able to
competently testify about how they generate suspect fingerprints
for analysis and, ultimately, conviction. With insufficient expertise
on the conviction programs producing the results introduced at
trial, defense counsel’s opportunity to cross-examine these experts
is insufficient to meet the demands of the Sixth Amendment right
to confront witnesses against the defendant. 31 Finally, the secrecy
shielding all of this evidence from discovery is also questionable

28. See infra Parts IV–V; see also generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS &
TRAINING COMM’N, FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, BREATH TEST OPERATOR: A
SPECIALIZED TRAINING COURSE 6 (2015) (summarizing the science behind
breathalyzers without referencing the algorithm and source code that are integral
to producing the relevant values admissible in court).
29. See infra Parts III–IV; see also generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS &
TRAINING COMM’N, supra note 28 (neglecting to explicate the algorithms and
source codes underlying breathalyzers).
30. When TrueAllele and STRmix have been used in courts recently, the
government has called the computer programs’ developers to the stand to testify
about the accuracy and reliability of the programs. See Lauren Kirchner,
Sentenced by an Algorithm: Where Traditional DNA Testing Fails, New
Technology Takes Over, PAC. STANDARD (Nov. 9, 2016), https://perma.cc/LJB6E2RH (last updated June 14, 2017) (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). This is not generally the case with evidence
based on, for example, breathalyzer programs or AFISs. The difference, it seems,
is the newness of these DNA-focused computer programs. The programs used to
calculate breathalyzer results and match fingerprints are generally not
challenged in court, and they certainly are not challenged in the same way by
calling on an expert familiar with the underlying algorithms and source codes. In
a sense, these technologies seem to have been grandfathered in under the
criminal justice system.
31. See infra Part V.
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under Brady v. Maryland 32 and its progeny, as well as the
statutory discovery requirements of some states. 33
This Article challenges the use of conviction programs —their
algorithms and source codes—under these secret conditions,
arguing that greater disclosure is generally necessary to meet the
constitutional requirements essential to the defendant having an
opportunity to make his defense, confront witnesses, and truly
benefit from due process guarantees. Part II describes the rise of
the criminal justice system’s confidence in and dependence on
predictive algorithms and their underlying source codes to aid
judges and parole boards in making bail, sentencing, and parole
decisions. It outlines the reasons why decisionmakers within the
criminal justice system increasingly rely on these programs and
also summarizes the common criticisms of this reliance. Part III
explains that, while the benefits and drawbacks of relying on these
predictive algorithms and their source codes are relatively well
known, the more concerning reliance on computer programs in the
context of convicting criminal defendants has largely gone
unnoticed. This Part delineates three program-based conviction
tools that prosecutorial teams use to help convict defendants:
breathalyzers, AFISs, 34 and computerized DNA interpretation
programs. 35 It also explains that the details of these programs are
generally kept secret and that there are real questions about the
accuracy of these programs. Part IV expands upon the secrecy
shrouding the details of the conviction programs that prosecutors
employ, explaining how defendants are generally denied access to
32. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
33. See infra Part V; see also, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (2018)
(requiring the state upon motion to provide “the complete files of all law
enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and prosecutors’ offices involved in
the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant”).
34. As explained in Part IV.A.2, AFISs are not usually directly used in
securing convictions. Instead, these programs usually provide human fingerprint
examiners with a handful of the most likely candidate fingerprints to match
against, for example, a fingerprint found at a crime scene. The human interpreter
then determines whether there is a match and may testify at trial. Id. However,
because fingerprint examiners employ questionable methods themselves in
determining whether there is a match, the AFIS potential matches from which
they often begin their analyses play a large part in the evidence that is eventually
introduced at trial to convict criminal defendants. Id.
35. The computer programs I refer to here are probabilistic genotyping
systems (PGSs).
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this information that could prove material to their cases. It also
emphasizes the importance of transparency for testing the
accuracy of these programs. Further, this Part explains that
lawyers and the criminal justice system tend to revere computer
programs and science and technology in general. Certainly, there
is value in pursuing an objective approach to criminal justice
determinations, but science and technology are not infallible, and
it is important that actors within the criminal justice system
recognize this. Finally, Part V argues that this secrecy is of
constitutional proportions, as it denies defendants their due
process rights to have meaningful opportunities to present full
defenses, and it detracts from their confrontation rights to examine
witnesses about the algorithms and source codes upon which their
convictions are ultimately based. Employing these secret
conviction programs even has implications for prosecutors’ duties
under Brady and other applicable statutory disclosure
requirements. Where police officers, prosecutors, and experts
employ secret conviction programs, criminal defendants’
constitutional rights are in jeopardy.
II. Predictive Criminal Justice Programs
Judges, parole boards, and even prosecutors and police officers
have all begun relying on computer algorithms and source codes in
their roles within the criminal justice system. 36 Some judges
employ programs in setting bail to help them predict whether
suspects are likely to appear for their court dates and whether they
pose a danger to the public. 37 And some judges use programs to
assess the future dangerousness of offenders so that they can

36. See Ric Simmons, Big Data and Procedural Justice: Legitimizing
Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 573 (2018)
(describing criminal justice actors’ uses of algorithms in the criminal justice
system).
37. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1109, 1124, 1120 (2017) (“In the pretrial detention stage, judges in many
states routinely rely on risk assessment instruments to predict future
dangerousness before deciding on release conditions.”); Lauryn P. Gouldin,
Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 713–18 (2018).
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properly sentence them. 38 Many parole boards similarly rely on
computer programs to assess the likelihood of recidivism to
determine whether an offender should be granted parole. 39 There
are both benefits and drawbacks to relying on such a systematized
approach to justice. To fully understand the advantages and
disadvantages, though, it is first necessary to understand the
different working parts of modern computer programs.
A. Computer Programs—Algorithms and Source Codes
Various actors within the criminal justice system regularly
rely on computer programs to predict behavior. 40 Like typical
computer programs, these prediction programs consist of
algorithms and the underlying source codes to implement those
algorithms. An algorithm is a set of rules used to solve a problem
through a series of discrete steps. 41 And “algorithm” is the term
commentators often use to describe the programs jurisdictions in
recent years have used to help set bail, determine sentences, and
make parole decisions. 42 How experts put these algorithms to use,
though, complicates matters. In the age of computers, they often
computerize these algorithms to increase efficiency. This requires
that the algorithm be translated into source code. 43 A computer
38. See Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1120 (“[M]ost states have adopted some
measure of actuarial prediction in sentencing or parole determinations.”).
39. See id.
40. This is sometimes referred to as “[a]ctuarial prediction.” Id. at 1118–19.
41. See Algorithm, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2012) (“A procedure
or set of rules used in calculation and problem-solving . . . a precisely defined set
of mathematical or logical operations for the performance of a particular task.”).
42. See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://perma.cc/2FSK-27MK (last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (referring to “algorithms”
used to predict recidivism) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Lauren Kirchner, Where Traditional DNA Testing Fails, Algorithms Take Over:
Powerful Software Is Solving More Crimes and Raising New Questions About Due
Process, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 4, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://perma.cc/9DQZ-5YKG (last
visited Oct. 5, 2019) (discussing “algorithms” used to determine the likelihood
that a DNA sample from a crime scene came from a particular individual) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
43. See PELIN AKSOY & LAURA DENARDIS, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN
THEORY 102 – 04 (2008); JUNE JAMRICH PARSONS, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COMPUTER
CONCEPTS 2018, at 777, 785 (2018) (briefly describing algorithms and source
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programmer can convert the algorithm into a variety of source code
or programming languages—such as C, C++, BASIC, Python,
Java, JavaScript, IOS, or SQL—each of which would look slightly
different but could be generally recognizable by those competent in
the field. 44 A compiler or interpreter then translates the source
code into object or machine code, which presents as a series of ones
and zeros. 45 This string of numbers is generally incomprehensible
to humans. But it effects an output, which can then be used for
various purposes, such as to predict the behaviors of criminal
offenders. 46 The technicalities and nuances of this process, though,
generally remain hidden from the users of the program, making it
difficult for them to understand the way in which the task is
performed.
B. A History of Seeking Predictions
The criminal justice system’s harnessing of predictive power
dates back to the late 1920s. 47 Even without the power of
computing, the criminal justice system turned to prediction
algorithms to assess the risk of offenders’ recidivism on parole. 48
In recent years, as evidence-based practices have gained steam,
use of these tools has ballooned. 49 Not only do jurisdictions use
codes).
44. See AKSOY & DENARDIS, supra note 43, at 102–04; PARSONS, supra note
43, at 786; MICHAEL L. SCOTT, PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE PRAGMATICS 4–5, 11, 14
(4th ed. 2016).
45. See AKSOY & DENARDIS, supra note 43, at 102–04.
46. See Angwin et al., supra note 42.
47. See BERNARD HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION 47 (2007); Timeline of
Computer History, COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM, https://perma.cc/R9A2-LKQF
(last visited Oct. 5, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. See Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1117–20 (briefly relating the history of
an actuarial approach to criminal justice); see also HARCOURT, supra note 47, at
47 (explaining that “[t]he actuarial impulse was strong [even] in the 1920s”).
49. See Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN.
L. REV. 303, 312–14 (2018) (explaining that “their use has rapidly accelerated over
recent years”); Angwin et al., supra note 42 (“[R]isk assessments . . . are
increasingly common in courtrooms across the nation. . . . In Arizona, Colorado,
Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Virginia, Washington, and
Wisconsin, the results of such assessments are given to judges during criminal
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these tools in making parole decisions, but now judges also use
them in setting bail and sentencing. 50 Rapidly advancing
technology has even further magnified the power of these
prediction programs, and several jurisdictions now employ
computer-based risk-assessment tools such as Correctional
Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions
(COMPAS)—a risk assessment tool created and licensed by
Northpointe. 51

sentencing.”); cf. Kirchner, supra note 42 (explaining that “[t]he emergence of
algorithmic analysis programs . . . is creating a new frontier of DNA science,” that
these “tools are so new and expensive that only a handful of local crime labs use
them regularly,” and that “as law enforcement looks to DNA more and more
frequently to solve even minor crimes, that seems almost certain to change”).
50. See Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1120–21 (“Today, actuarial prediction
impacts almost all aspects of the criminal justice system, from the initial bail
decision to the final parole release.”). One additional area in which computer
programs are today playing a significant role is in policing. See ANDREW GUTHRIE
FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 2 (2017) (describing “big data policing”). Police
departments throughout the country now employ sophisticated programs to
assess the likelihood of crime taking place in particular locations. See id. at 67
(“Today, several dozen cities are using some form of predictive policing
technology.”). Although police departments have long tried to find patterns in
reported crimes to try to predict the locations of future crime and marshal their
resources accordingly, technological advances have allowed these departments to
more firmly put the power of statistics behind them to improve their predictions.
See Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1117–20. Today, various companies license
programs like PredPol and HunchLab to help police departments make more
informed decisions about how best to fight crime. See HunchLab—Next
Generation Predictive Policing Software, HUNCHLAB, https://perma.cc/5FUXDGPY (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (stating that it employs “advanced statistical
models [to] forecast when and where crimes are likely to emerge”); Predict Prevent
CrimePredictive Policing Software, PREDPOL, https://perma.cc/W98H-H56L
(last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (stating that PredPol “predict[s] where and when
specific crimes are most likely to occur”). Select police departments across the
country rely on programs like these to assist their decisions about where, when,
and how to best police their communities. See FERGUSON, supra, at 67.
51. See NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 2 (2015),
https://perma.cc/3NDH-YVAK (PDF); Sam Corbett-Davies et al., A Computer
Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions Was Labeled Biased Against
Blacks. It’s Actually Not That Clear., WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/375A-VT4Y (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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In general, these assessment tools are based on answers to a
number of questions, such as: What is the offender’s marital
status? 52 What is his highest education level? 53 Does he have any
history of drug use? 54 Based on the answers to these questions, the
particular tool will predict, at least to some degree, the likelihood
that the offender will engage in certain conduct, such as future
criminal acts or fleeing the jurisdiction. When using an automated
tool like COMPAS, the algorithm and underlying source code used
to calculate the relevant risk scores are often not available to the
defendant or even the program user. 55
COMPAS—and programs like it—are meant to improve
objectivity, fairness, and efficiency in setting bail and doling out
sentences. 56 Finding these factors desirable, jurisdictions
throughout the country rely on such algorithms and source codes
to predict recidivism, which can affect bail, sentencing, and
parole. 57
C. The Allure
Proponents of these predictive criminal justice programs
explain that such a methodical, evidence-based approach to
difficult criminal justice questions will usher in a system with
greater fairness, consistency, and accuracy. 58 Our criminal justice
52. See Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 805, 811–12 (2014);
VRAG-R SCORING SHEET 2, https://perma.cc/RM63-7GWC (PDF).
53. See Starr, supra note 52, at 811–12; Christopher T. Lowenkamp et al.,
The Predictive Validity of the LSI-R on a Sample of Offenders Drawn from the
Records of the Iowa Department of Corrections Data Management System, FED.
PROBATION, 2 (2001), https://perma.cc/5CQC-2G45 (PDF).
54. See id.; VRAG-R SCORING SHEET, supra note 52, at 2.
55. See infra Part IV.
56. See NORTHPOINTE, supra note 51, at 2 (“In overloaded and crowded
criminal justice systems, brevity, efficiency, ease of administration, and clear
organization of key risk/needs data are critical. COMPAS was designed to
optimize these practical factors.”).
57. See id.
58. See Anna Maria Barry-Jester et al., Should Prison Sentences Be Based
On Crimes That Haven’t Been Committed Yet?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 4, 2015),
https://perma.cc/SLH8-4ACW (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (examining some of the
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system is riddled with concerns of biases. For example, the
disproportionate number of black males in American prisons has
been described as resulting from “the new Jim Crow”; 59 blacks and
Hispanics are more often the targets of stops and frisks than
whites; 60 and there have been vociferous outcries against the large
numbers of black male youths who have recently been killed by law
enforcement officers. 61 Trying to address these problems is
risks and benefits of using these predictive models) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Adam Neufeld, In Defense of Risk-Assessment Tools,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 22, 2017, 10:00 AM) https://perma.cc/53VZ-TK5B (last
visited Oct. 6, 2019) (acknowledging that “[i]t may seem weird to rely on an
impersonal algorithm to predict a person’s behavior given the enormous stakes”
but arguing that “the gravity of the outcome—in cost, crime, and wasted human
potential—is exactly why we should use an algorithm” in these circumstances)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); SARAH PICARD-FRITSCHE ET
AL., CTR. FOR COURT INNOVATION, DEMYSTIFYING RISK ASSESSMENT: KEY
PRINCIPLES AND CONTROVERSIES 11–12 (2017), https://perma.cc/U9PP-5HQR
(PDF) (emphasizing the usefulness of predictive criminal justice programs but
also noting critics’ concerns).
59. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that the mass
incarceration of black men in the name of the War on Drugs amounts to a “new
Jim Crow”).
60. See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(concluding that New York City’s “policy of indirect racial profiling . . . has
resulted in the disproportionate and discriminatory stopping of blacks and
Hispanics in violation of the Equal Protection Clause”); ELIZABETH DAVIS &
ANTHONY WHYDE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND
THE PUBLIC, 2015, at 9 (2018), https://perma.cc/F3UZ-2T5M (PDF) (highlighting
that “[a] greater percentage of blacks than whites experienced police-initiated
contact during their most recent contact”).
61. See, e.g., Mario L. Barnes, Criminal Justice for Those (Still) at the
Margins—Addressing Hidden Forms of Bias and the Politics of Which Lives
Matter, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 711, 713–14 (2015) (explaining that the “Black Lives
Matter” movement arose out of police killings of young, unarmed black men);
Collier Meyerson, Another Black Boy Was Killed by Police. Will Justice Be Done
This Time?, THE NATION (May 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/X9VS-JERC (last visited
Oct. 6, 2019) (reacting to the many recent killings of black children by police
officers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Brentin Mock, How
Structural Racism is Linked to Higher Rates of Police Violence, CITYLAB (Feb. 15,
2018), https://perma.cc/V2D7-EEH4 (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (“Many studies do
show that racism plays a part in causing police to pull the trigger more quickly
on black suspects. That’s usually because of the implicit racial biases of the
individual police officer involved.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Further, Project Implicit at Harvard University suggests that biases are
deeper and more difficult to correct than may at first be apparent. See About Us,

SECRET CONVICTION PROGRAMS

283

difficult, though. Decisionmakers in the criminal justice
arena—whether judges, prosecutors, jurors, or parole board
members—are human beings with built-in prejudices and biases,
whether conscious or unconscious. 62 Harvard University’s Project
Implicit—an ongoing study collecting data on individuals’
biases—has found that nearly everyone suffers from bias. 63
Whether biases are a result of evolution—allowing our brains to
take mental shortcuts to more easily survive 64—upbringing, 65 or
culture, 66 biases can be detrimental and unjust to criminal
defendants. Biases might result in a particular defendant being
PROJECT IMPLICIT (2011), https://perma.cc/8NUZ-Y5DB (last visited Oct. 6, 2019)
[hereinafter PROJECT IMPLICIT] (collecting data on individuals’ implicit biases) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Kristin A. Lane et al.,
Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 427, 431–39 (2007)
(pointing out that nearly everyone possesses implicit biases, explaining that these
biases are very strong and that they also predict behavior, and noting that this
link between bias and behavior can be moderated under certain conditions).
62. See PROJECT IMPLICIT, supra note 61; Lane et al., supra note 61; Annie
Murphy Paul, Where Bias Begins: The Truth About Stereotypes, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(May 1, 1998), https://perma.cc/6FY8-KJL8 (last visited Oct. 6, 2019)
(“Psychologists once believed that only bigoted people used stereotypes. Now the
study of unconscious bias is revealing the unsettling truth: We all use stereotypes,
all the time, without knowing it. We have met the enemy of equality, and the
enemy is us.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
63. See PROJECT IMPLICIT, supra note 61; see also Meghan J. Ryan & John
Adams, Cultivating Judgment on the Tools of Wrongful Conviction, 68 SMU L.
REV. 1073, 1101 (2015) (“One of the major sources of information about the
existence of implicit biases comes from the Implicit Association Test (IAT). In this
test, subjects are asked to ‘rapidly classify individual stimuli into’ particular
categories, and the subjects’ rates of classification are then measured.” (internal
citations omitted)).
64. See Martie G. Haselton et al., The Evolution of Cognitive Bias, in 2
HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY 968, 968–69 (David M. Buss ed., 2d ed.
2016); see also Christopher Dwyer, 12 Common Biases that Affect How We Make
Everyday Decisions, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/CFL8CMC5 (last visited Oct 6. 2019) (suggesting that in-group bias is evolutionary) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
65. See Eva H. Telzer et al., Amygdala Sensitivity to Race Is Not Present in
Childhood but Emerges over Adolescence, 25 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 234, 234,
240, 242 (2013) (suggesting that racial bias is a product of upbringing); Robert
Wright, Nature vs. Nurture? New Research Shows Racism Isn’t Innate, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 18, 2012), https://perma.cc/HW2H-XDXN (last visited Oct. 6, 2019) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See Paul, supra note 62 (“Much of what enters our consciousness, of
course, comes from the culture around us.”).
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convicted when he would not have been convicted in the absence of
bias, receiving a longer sentence than someone who committed the
same crime but was not of the same race, getting his bail set at a
higher amount than someone of a different religion, or not being
granted parole when someone of a different ethnicity would have
been granted parole. 67 Decisionmakers can mitigate their biases
through education if the decisionmaker acknowledges the problem
and has an open mind about the offered education, 68 so there is
some hope for alleviating biases within the criminal justice system.
Despite being a concern that commentators have recognized for
years, though, biases within the system persist.
Aside from biases within the system, there is also the problem
of other inequities, which is inherent in a system that generally
relies on different decisionmakers in each case. 69 This concern
about lack of uniformity explains the rise of mandatory sentencing
guidelines in this country 70 (which were later found to be
unconstitutional 71) and, to some extent, mandatory minimum
sentences. 72 As Marvin Frankel famously explained, a judge might
67. See Angwin et al., supra note 42 (“For more than two centuries, the key
decisions in the legal process, from pretrial release to sentencing to parole, have
been in the hands of human beings guided by their instincts and personal
biases.”).
68. See Lane et al., supra note 61, at 437–39 (stating that implicit social
cognitions may change based on varied experiences and environments); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME. L.
REV. 1195, 1226–32 (2009) (describing how training can mitigate judicial bias);
Ryan & Adams, supra note 63, at 1102 (“Providing some hope for limiting how
these biases might affect decisionmaking, . . . studies suggest that implicit biases
can possibly be reduced or at least that decisionmakers, provided proper
motivation, are capable of compensating for their biases.”).
69. See generally Anthony Niblett, Tracking Inconsistent Judicial Behavior,
34 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. (2013) (examining inconsistencies in judicial
decisionmaking).
70. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 255 (2005) (“Congress enacted
the sentencing statutes in major part to achieve greater uniformity in sentencing,
i.e., to increase the likelihood that offenders who engage in similar real conduct
would receive similar sentences.”).
71. See generally id. at 245 (holding that the mandatory federal sentencing
guidelines are unconstitutional).
72. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 13–14 (1991),
https://perma.cc/LBH5-A4CG (PDF) (“Mandatory minimums are meant to ensure
that defendants convicted of similar offenses receive penalties that at least begin
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sentence a defendant to an entire additional year in prison just
because the defendant spoke disrespectfully to the judge. 73 This
concern of one offender receiving harsher treatment than a
similarly situated offender just because of his bad luck is a
continuing one.
Even if defendants are not affected by biases or other
inequities within the system, they are often subject to guesswork
by judges and parole boards. 74 Judges and parole boards may base
at the same minimal point.”). But see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking
Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 210 (1993) (explaining that
“[e]nsuring equal treatment of like offenders prevents one form of disparity, but
the resulting equal treatment of unlike offenders creates another serious
problem—excessive uniformity” and stating that “[e]xcessive uniformity is
inevitable under mandatories because the statutes necessarily single out just one
or a very small number of factors to determine the minimum sentence”).
73. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 18
(1972). Frankel famously related:
One story concerns a casual anecdote over cocktails in a rare
conversation among judges touching the subject of sentencing. Judge
X, to designate him in a lawyerlike way, told of a defendant for whom
the judge, after reading the presentence report, had decided tentatively
upon a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing
in the courtroom, after hearing counsel, Judge X invited the defendant
to exercise his right to address the court in his own behalf. The
defendant took a sheaf of papers from his pocket and proceeded to read
from them, excoriating the judge, and “kangaroo court” in which he’d
been tried, and the legal establishment in general. Completing the
story, Judge X said, “I listened without interrupting. Finally, when he
said he was through, I simply gave the son of a bitch five years instead
of four.” None of the three judges listening to that (including me)
tendered a whisper of dissent, let alone a scream of outrage. But think
about it. . . . a year in prison for speaking disrespectfully to a judge.
Id.
74. See Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Politics of Predicting Criminal Violence, 86
MICH. L. REV. 1322, 1325 (1988) (explaining Stephen Gottfredson and Marc
Miller’s response to questions about the usefulness of actuarial tools: “Because
judges and parole boards do predict and because their unaided predictions are
even less accurate than chance, actuarial predictions are better than the current
system of implicit and ignorant guesses.”); Sam B. Warner & Henry B. Cabot,
Changes in the Administration of Criminal Justice During the Past Fifty Years,
50 HARV. L. REV. 583, 607 (1937) (referring to judges’ and parole boards’
sentencing and release decisions as “a matter of guesswork”); cf. William W.
Wilkins et al., Competing Sentencing Policies in a “War on Drugs” Era, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 305, 309 (1993) (explaining that, before the federal guidelines,
“judges frequently engaged in the ‘guessing game’ of imposing sentences in
anticipation of potential release dates authorized by the Parole Commission”).
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their bail, sentencing, and parole decisions on a broad array of
factors, including their own experiences both inside and outside of
the courtroom and parole board hearing room. 75 But they
historically have not made their decisions based on social science
research meant to assess the probability that any particular
defendant will make his court appearances, recidivate, or pose
other risks to society. 76
Using computer programs in setting bail, sentencing, and
deciding parole issues can be effective in achieving fairness across
cases. Computer algorithms and their source codes are automated
approaches to criminal justice, and the individual decisionmakers
within the system—from judges to parole board members—can
potentially dole out justice without being influenced by, for
example, what they had for breakfast, if they depend on computer
programs to make their decisions for them. Relying on these
programs can also help judges and other decisionmakers avoid
injecting their own biases into decisions on bail, sentencing, and
In
these
senses,
computer-program-based
parole. 77
decisionmaking serves the goals of system-wide fairness and
consistency. Further, these computer programs are generally built
on social science data to produce more accurate predictions about
human behavior. 78 In this sense, they may be considered better
than the hunches on which judges and parole boards base their
decisions.
Employing computer programs to resolve criminal justice
issues can also inject efficiency into the system. 79 Automated
75. See Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Neilsen, Examining Empathy:
Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313,
324 (2012) (stating that “judges do not completely abandon their experiences
when deciding cases”).
76. See Johnson, supra note 74, at 1325 (noting that judges’ and parole
boards’ “unaided predictions are even less accurate than chance”); Warner &
Cabot, supra note 74, at 607 (referring to judicial “guesswork” in sentencing and
noting that the information on which sentencing judges have traditionally based
these decisions has been quite limited).
77. See Neufeld, supra note 58 (“[A]lgorithms aren’t directly subject to
human cognitive biases . . . .” (emphasis added)).
78. See PICARD-FRITSCHE ET AL., supra note 58, at 8–10 (describing the
development of risk assessment tools using social science research).
79. See Sarah Fishel et al., Computer Risk Algorithms and Judicial Decisionmaking, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Jan. 2018), https://perma.cc/S2XY-9ZFS (last visited
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justice is often swift justice. 80 Not surprisingly, then, players
within the criminal justice system are beginning to rely more
heavily on computer programs to keep the machinery of
justice—or at least of the system—moving. 81
D. Predictable Criticisms
Although adopting a data-driven approach to criminal jusitce
is alluring, some commentators have criticized the use of computer
programs in all of these areas—in setting bail, sentencing, and
making parole decisions—for embedding and exacerbating biases
in the criminal justice system. 82 Most often, these commentators
focus their criticisms on the particular factors that control the
algorithms’ outputs. 83 For example, factors like employment
status, marital status, and educational level—factors often used in
assessments of future dangerousness—are often proxies for race. 84
Oct. 6, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
80. See id. (“[L]egal decision-makers can drastically increase the expediency
of their decision-making within an often slow and overburdened system.”).
81. See STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 110 (2012)
(stating that, “[w]hen judges and scholars evaluate criminal procedure, they tend
to focus on efficiency”).
82. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 52, at 821; Angwin et al., supra note 42
(asserting that COMPAS results “turned up significant racial disparities”).
83. A study by ProPublica exposed racial disparities in the results produced
by Northpointe’s predictive algorithm COMPAS. See Angwin et al., supra note 42.
According to the study, the algorithm was “particularly likely to falsely flag black
defendants as future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice
the rate as white defendants.” Id.
84. See CHRISTINE S. SCOTT-HAYWARD & HENRY F. FRADELLA, PUNISHING
POVERTY: HOW BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION FUEL INEQUALITIES IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 121 (2019) (explaining that “there is little doubt that both general
and pretrial risk assessment instruments rely on static risk factors”—“such as
age, sex, marital status, education level, employment history, and financial
status”—"that are statistically associated with race and ethnicity”); Angele
Christin et al., Courts and Predictive Algorithms, DATA & CIVIL RIGHTS: A NEW
ERA OF POLICING AND JUSTICE, DATACIVILRIGHTS.ORG (Oct. 27, 2015),
https://perma.cc/DA7Z-KVR5 (PDF) (arguing that, “[r]egardless of their impact,
the very method used to build these algorithms might make them
unconstitutional” because, even though “[n]one of the sentencing instruments use
race as a variable, . . . many variables included in the models play the role of
‘proxies’ for race, in that they strongly correlate with race and reflect racial bias”);
Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment,
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Even if including these factors leads to more accurate predictions,
many consider it morally or politically repugnant to use them in
decisions affecting individuals’ futures because they lead to
negative outcomes disproportionately affecting certain races. 85
In addition to these race-based criticisms, one might argue
that, in achieving greater uniformity and fairness across cases, the
system is sacrificing fairness in individual cases. This is the same
criticism lodged against other attempts to achieve system-wide
fairness, such as the mandatory guideline sentencing regimes of
the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. 86 Requiring judges to impose
pre-set punishments for particular crimes meant that judges often
could not tailor offenders’ sentences to their individual
circumstances or the particulars of the committed offense. 87
According to many, this resulted in great injustices. 88 Attempts to
achieve uniformity among cases often translates into not being
able to individualize the sentence or other criminal justice outcome
in the particular case at bar. 89 In some sense, then, fairness across
cases comes at the price of fairness within an individual case.

27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015); Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing:
An “Unsettled” Proposition, 30 JUST. Q. 270, 279–84 (2013).
85. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
86. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for
Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 920 (1991) (“Guidelines designed to
promote equality have produced unequal results—results that scatter years of
imprisonment almost by lottery. These results would have been inconceivable in
the old regime of discretionary sentencing.”); Don J. DeBenedictis, How Long Is
Too Long?, 79 A.B.A. J. 74, 74 (1993) (“Critics charge that mandatory sentences,
by denying use even of the guidelines’ adjustments and departures, prevent
judges from considering a defendant's individual circumstances or culpability.
Mandatory minimums are inherently unfair, they say, because they force judges
to sentence crimes, not criminals.”); David Yellen, What Juvenile Court
Abolitionists Can Learn from the Failures of Sentencing Reform, 1996 WIS. L. REV.
577, 587 (1996) (“Judges throughout the country complain that some sentencing
guidelines and virtually all mandatory minimum statutes force them to impose
unjust sentences because the judges are precluded from considering the unique
circumstances of offenders.”).
87. See Yellen, supra note 86, at 587.
88. See MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 167–70 (1995); Alschuler, supra note 86, at 920; DeBenedictis, supra
note 86, at 74; Yellen, supra note 86, at 587.
89. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
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For example, one of these programs might find that, in
general, a single man who has not received a high school diploma
(and who happens to be black) is more likely to recidivate than a
married man who has graduated from college (and who happens to
be white). But that does not mean that a particular single man who
has not received a high school diploma may be more likely to
recidivate than anyone else. One might say that his race—even
though not specifically being taken into account—is being held
against him because it correlates with his marital status and
educational level. This is a valid criticism, but it is of course true
that, regardless of race or any other factor, these predictions of
future dangerousness, or anything else, are only risk
assessments. 90 They are generalizations based on the limited data
available. 91
Beyond these race- and individualization-based criticisms,
some commentators have argued that these criminal justice
programs are not as accurate as they might seem anyway. 92 First,
the predictions the programs generate are only as good as the data
on which they rely. 93 As Professors Wayne Logan and Andrew
Ferguson have explained, there are numerous sources of error
involved with both the collection and generation of this data. 94
Relatedly, there are questions about the accuracy of the
algorithms’ and source codes’ outputs. In certain studies, some of
these prediction programs’ results have proved to be only about as
90. See Sam Corbett-Davies et al., supra note 51.
91. See id.
92. See, e.g., Starr, supra note 52, at 842 (“The instruments’ first serious
limitation is that they do not provide anything even approaching a precise
prediction of an individual’s recidivism risk.”); Angwin et al., supra note 42
(“When a full range of crimes were taken into account—including misdemeanors
such as driving with an expired license—the algorithm was somewhat more
accurate than a coin flip. Of those deemed likely to re-offend, 61 percent were
arrested for any subsequent crimes within two years.”).
93. See Elizabeth E. Joh, Feeding the Machine: Policing, Crime Data, &
Algorithims, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287, 294 (2017) (explaining that
“algorithmic decisionmaking has been subjected to the ‘garbage in, garbage out’
critique: that any decision is as good or as bad as the data relied upon by the
program”).
94. See generally Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing
Criminal Justice Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541 (2016) (summarizing the numerous
sources of error associated with data used within the criminal justice system).
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accurate as outcomes based purely on chance. 95 For example, in
2016, ProPublica investigated the “largely hidden effect of
algorithms in American life” and found risk assessment measures
to be “remarkably unreliable.” 96 In particular, ProPublica
gathered risk assessment scores assigned to a large sample of
arrestees in Broward County, Florida. 97 It then examined how
many of these arrestees “were charged with new crimes over the
next two years, the same benchmark used by the creators of the
[COMPAS] algorithm.” 98 ProPublica determined that, “when a full
range of crimes were taken into account . . . the algorithm was
[only] somewhat more accurate than a coin flip. Of those deemed
likely to re-offend, 61 percent were arrested for any subsequent
crimes within two years.” 99 These findings have raised serious
questions about the accuracy of at least Northpointe’s program. 100
Additionally, many people commonly understand risk
assessment programs as predicting a defendant’s risk of future
dangerousness; in reality, however, a number of these programs
instead only order defendants by their risks of future

95. See Angwin et al., supra note 42; see also Ferguson, supra note 37, at
1144 (stating in reference to predictive policing programs that, “[l]ike an
old-school weather forecast, the data can provide localized forecasts—‘cloudy with
a chance of murder’—with a significant degree of variability and fallibility”).
96. See Angwin et al., supra note 42.
97. See id.
98. Id.; see also NORTHPOINTE, supra note 51, at 27 (2015),
https://perma.cc/A665-WHGU (PDF) (“The recidivism risk scale was developed to
predict new offenses subsequent to the COMPAS assessment date. The outcome
used for the original scale construction was a new misdemeanor or felony offense
within two years of the COMPAS administration date.”), cited in Angwin et al.,
supra note 42.
99. Angwin et al., supra note 42. A study by the founders of Northpointe
concluded that the predictive validity of the algorithm was around seventy to
eighty percent and that its reliability hovered around seventy percent. See Tim
Brennan et al., Evaluating the Predictive Validity of the COMPAS Risk and Needs
Assessment System, 36 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 21, 31–34 (2009).
100. It seems that there are a number of shortcomings to ProPublica’s study,
however, including sample size, sample breadth, and potential confounding
variables. See Angwin et al., supra note 42. Further, ProPublica’s study focused
on just one risk assessment algorithm—Northpointe’s COMPAS. Although this
system is widely employed, it is not the only algorithm in use and thus cannot
alone condemn all risk assessment algorithms.
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dangerousness. 101 Imagine that you have one group of defendants
who range from a ten percent chance of recidivating to a sixty
percent chance of recidivating and another group of defendants
who range from a two percent chance of recidivating to a ten
percent chance of recidivating. The program would score an equal
number of defendants within each group as having a high risk of
future dangerousness, and it would score an equal number within
each group as having a low risk of future dangerousness. 102 In
other words, the scores are curved depending on the other
members within the defendant group. This means that the
intended “accuracy” in this context relates to the accuracy of the
ordering rather than the accuracy of a risk-of-recidivism
calculation. Such an approach is generally much less useful if
sentencing and parole decisions are to be based on true risks of
recidivism rather than on, for example, the availability of
resources like empty prison beds. 103

101. See, e.g., NORTHPOINTE, COMPAS RISK & NEED ASSESSMENT SYSTEM:
SELECTED QUESTIONS POSED BY INQUIRING AGENCIES, at 5 (2012),
https://perma.cc/73A6-2TK7 (PDF) (describing how COMPAS scores and ranks
individuals).
102. See, e.g., id.; see also Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J.
2218, 2246 (2019) (explaining that a popular measure of risk assessment tools’
performance is “area under the curve,” which “conveys the probability that, for
any two people selected at random in the data, the algorithm will correctly order
them in terms of risk” (emphasis added)); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous
Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 513 (2018) (explaining that “[a] classification as
high risk does not assert that Person A will fail to appear or be rearrested unless
restrained” but instead only “purports to . . . rank Person A relative to the rest of
the population upon which the instrument was developed”); cf. Jessica M. Eaglin,
Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 87 (2017) (explaining that
“[t]ranslating tool outcomes into risk categories is a highly subjective,
policy-oriented process” and that “[t]his decision requires some expertise not only
in what the tool is predicting, but also in how society interprets the numerical
outcome’s meaning”: “In short, where developers place cut-off points reflects a
normative judgment about how much likelihood of risk is acceptable in society
without intervention.”).
103. If the availability of resources like empty prison beds is to be a significant
factor in these determinations, this might be a reason to find a set number or
percentage of low-risk or high-risk defendants regardless of the true risk of the
defendant.
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In general, there has been little investigation into the accuracy
of risk assessment computer programs. 104 The few researchers
assessing these programs are generally the programs’ developers
themselves, who obviously have conflicts of interest; they have
financial and reputational interests in the popularity and wide
acceptance of the programs. 105 Still, many jurisdictions have
already adopted these programs, 106 and many more are
considering adopting them in the future. 107 They have often done
so without fully understanding or testing the accuracy of the
results produced by the programs.
III. Conviction Programs
Critics have been pushing back against prediction programs
used for bail, sentencing, and parole, but they have largely
overlooked the use of computer programs for obtaining convictions.
As courts and parole boards have, over the years, been increasingly
relying on computer programs to aid in criminal justice
decisionmaking, police officers, forensic scientists, and prosecutors
have quietly been relying on computer programs to produce
various forms of incriminating evidence. 108 Longstanding
examples of this include evidence created by breathalyzers and
AFISs. 109 Further, the criminal justice system’s reliance on
conviction programs has reached into a new era wherein actors
rely on evidence produced by, for example, probabilistic genotyping
104. See Angwin et al., supra note 42 (“There have been few independent
studies of these criminal risk assessments.”).
105. See id.
106. See id. (noting that “many jurisdictions have adopted Northpointe’s
software before rigorously testing whether it works”).
107. See, e.g., Jolie McCullogh, Courts Have Called Texas Bail Practices
Unconstitutional. Will That Push This Year’s Reform Efforts to Success?, TEX.
TRIB. (Feb. 4, 2019), https://perma.cc/8EXT-XSZY (last visited Oct. 3, 2019)
(“[Texas] State Sen. John Whitmire, D-Houston, and state Rep. Andrew Murr,
R-Junction, announced Monday at the Capitol that they have again filed
legislation that would implement a risk-assessment tool for judges to use when
making bail decisions, among other proposals.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
108. See infra Part III.A.
109. Some other examples include radar guns and lidar detectors.
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systems (PGSs). 110 Although many of these technologies have
escaped effective and arresting criticism, they are actually more
pernicious than the prediction programs that are under attack.
Conviction programs are different from prediction programs in
important ways, including that prosecutors and experts regularly
present them as having the imprimatur of science and that more
is simply at stake when the question is one of innocence rather
than one of temporary pretrial confinement or punishment for
those already determined guilty. 111
A. An Array of Conviction Programs
Prosecutors, judges, and juries today rely on a wide range of
evidence to convict criminal defendants. Much of this evidence is
produced by scientific and technological research that is captured
in generally inaccessible computer programs and their underlying
algorithms and source codes. Some of these technologies, like
breathalyzers and AFISs, have been around for decades, 112 while
others, like PGSs, are new and emerging developments. 113 The
criminal justice actors who turn to these technologies for damning
evidence of guilt generally blindly rely on these programs and
unquestioningly accept their outputs. This may not be surprising
considering that the technologies are complicated and are viewed
in light of the objectivity and verifiability of science. But it raises
the question of whether these programs are quite as accurate as
they seem to be.

110. See Kirchner, supra note 42 (noting that TrueAllele, a PGS, was first
used in a criminal case in 2009).
111. See infra Part III.B.
112. See infra Part III.A.1.
113. One might classify these technologies as “[l]itigation-[r]elated [g]adgetry
and [s]oftware.” Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 2013–20
(2017).
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1. Breathalyzers 114 and Automated Fingerprint Identification
Systems
Criminal justice actors regularly employ computer programs
in carrying out their duties, and, in many areas, they have relied
on these same technologies for decades. 115 For example, when a
police officer pulls over a suspected drunk driver, he often has the
driver blow into a breathalyzer machine to determine the driver’s
blood or breath alcohol content. 116 In all states, a reading of 0.08 or
higher is, alone, a ground for a driving-while-intoxicated
conviction, regardless of whether the driver’s behavior suggested
that he was impaired. 117 The breathalyzer reading is based on an
internal algorithm and underlying source code that are generally
unknown by both the police officer and the driver. Similarly, when
a forensic scientist tries to use an AFIS to match a latent print
found at a crime scene to a known print in a law enforcement
database, she employs a computer program generally developed by
an independent company. 118 As with the breathalyzer operator, the
fingerprint examiner is generally unaware of how the algorithm
determines whether the prints match and the underlying source
code implementing that calculation. 119 Yet, compared to the recent
focus on prediction programs, commentators have given relatively
little attention to reliance on these technologies within the
criminal justice system. 120 This is despite the fact that the same
114. Throughout this article, I use the term “breathalyzer” in a generic sense.
There have historically been many breathalyzer devices, such as the
Drunk-O-Meter, Intoxilyzer, and the Breathalyzer, itself.
115. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
116. Blood alcohol content is calculated by first measuring the breath alcohol
content in the provided breath sample.
117. See Blood Alcohol Concentration Limits for Enforcement of Impaired
Driving Laws —U.S. States—2001, ALCOMETERS, https://perma.cc/G9XL-3HA5
(last visited Mar. 9, 2019) [hereinafter Blood Alcohol Concentration Limits]
(listing criminalized blood alcohol concentration levels by state) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
118. See Interview with James Loudermilk, Senior Director for Innovation
and Customer Solutions, IDEMIA Nat’l Sec. Sol’ns (July 15, 2019).
119. See id. The FBI declined to comment on this. See E-mail from Jeffrey
Heinze, Supervisory Special Agent, Office of Public Affairs, FBI, to author (Feb.
3, 2020, 08:50 CST) (on file with author).
120. See supra Part II.C–D.

SECRET CONVICTION PROGRAMS

295

concerns of accuracy exist in the conviction context as in the
prediction context. 121 With respect to conviction programs, the
allure of relying on computerized, “scientific” justice is strong, just
like in the context of prediction programs. 122 These programs offer
an air of fairness, consistency, and accuracy by operating according
to set algorithms and source codes that are thought to be built on
sound research. 123 In reality, though, there may be insufficient
research or validation studies propping up many of these programs
or the algorithms and source codes on which they are built. 124
Instead, many of these technologies, have, in a sense, been
grandfathered into the current system. The problem is that these
technologies are not being seriously questioned. Judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other actors within the
criminal justice system often blindly accept these technologies as
accurate and reliable evidence supporting convictions. That hardly
anyone is seriously questioning these technologies is disquieting.
2. New Technology: Probabilistic Genotyping Systems
Commentators have paid significantly more attention to
criminal justice actors’ recent use of the cutting-edge technology of
PGSs. Today, prosecutors regularly rely on DNA tests and
analyses to secure convictions in court. 125 In fact, some prosecutors
complain that, because jurors are so used to seeing DNA evidence
on television shows like CSI: Crime Scene Investigation, they often
demand DNA evidence before voting to convict, even if DNA
121. See supra Part II.D.
122. See supra Part II.C.
123. See Katherine Kwong, Note, The Algorithm Says You Did It: The Use of
Black Box Algorithms to Analyze Complex DNA Evidence, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
275, 276 (2018) (explaining there is not enough information released to determine
the fairness of these algorithms and source codes).
124. See infra notes 206–226 and accompanying text; cf. Ryan, supra note 14
(discussing the insufficiency of research supporting fingerprint matching).
125. Prosecutors rely on DNA analyses employing complex statistical
techniques to secure convictions, but these programs are also sometimes used to
exonerate those who have been wrongfully convicted. In fact, TrueAllele—one of
these programs—was recently employed to free a wrongfully convicted man. See
Kirchner, supra note 42.
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evidence is not available in the case. 126 Even if DNA evidence is
found at a crime scene, on a victim, or in some other incriminating
location, though, it sometimes may be in a state too contaminated
or diluted for analysis. 127 Additionally, DNA that has not been
properly preserved generally becomes ineligible for analysis after
a week, and, depending on where the DNA came from, maybe
sooner. 128 More problematic today, a DNA quantity on the order of
picograms is ordinarily necessary for examination. 129 Further, a
DNA sample that is comprised of multiple contributing DNA
samples may not be ripe for analysis because it is difficult to
disaggregate which DNA alleles belong to which contributors. 130 In
recent years, though, researchers have developed computer
programs to run statistical analyses on these types of low-level and
mixed samples so that analysts can determine the probability that
any particular individual was a contributor to the DNA sample at
126. See Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing
Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1050 (2006)
(explaining that “the ‘CSI effect’ is a term that legal authorities and the mass
media have coined to describe a supposed influence that watching the television
show CSI: Crime Scene Investigation has on juror behavior” and that the supposed
effect is “that jurors who see the high-quality forensic evidence presented on CSI
raise their standards in real trials, in which actual evidence is typically more
flawed and uncertain” and that, “[a]s a result, these CSI-affected jurors are
alleged to acquit defendants more frequently”).
127. See William C. Thompson et al., Forensic DNA Statistics: Still
Controversial in Some Cases, CHAMPION, Dec. 2012, at 12 (“When labs try to ‘type’
samples that contain too little DNA, or DNA that is too degraded, the results of
the DNA test can be unreliable.”).
128. See Karl M. McDonald, DNA Forensic Testing and Use of DNA Rape Kits
in Cases of Rape and Sexual Assault, FORENSIC MAG. (Jan. 26, 2015, 8:21 AM),
https://perma.cc/8XT4-6M7G (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). DNA from fingernail scrapings is generally
viable for two days, as is DNA from skin-to-skin contact. Id. DNA from a penis
can be viable for about twelve hours. Id. And “[f]ibers of anything put on the head
can last up to seven days.” Id.
129. See Roland A.H. van Oorschot et al., Forensic Trace DNA: A Review, 10
INVESTIGATIVE GENETICS 3 (2010) (stating that “[t]race DNA typically refers to
either the very limited and/or invisible biological samples and/or amounts of DNA
less than 100 pg” but that “some laboratories use a 200 pg limit as the threshold
limit”); cf. JOHN M. BUTLER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC DNA TYPING 111 (2010)
(“Typically 0.5 to 2.10 ng of input human DNA is optimal with current commercial
STR kits.”). A picogram = 1 x 10-12 grams.
130. See William C. Thompson et al., supra note 127, at 12, 14.
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issue. 131 Forensic analysts in the United States primarily use
TrueAllele and STRmix for this purpose, but other programs exist
as well. 132
When DNA analysts cannot discern which “peaks and valleys”
produced by their testing should be paired together because they
belong to one individual and not to the others whose DNA is also
present in the sample, TrueAllele and STRmix have the ability to
further the evaluation. 133 These programs run statistical analyses,
“calculat[ing] the probability of the peak heights [in the DNA
profile] given all the possible genotype combinations for the
individual contributors.” 134 Accordingly, TrueAllele and STRmix
purportedly can assess the probability that the sample contains
the DNA of an individual with a known DNA profile. 135 But,
because an algorithm embedded in a computer program formulates
131. See Michael D. Coble & Jo-Anne Bright, Probabilistic Genotyping
Software: An Overview, 38 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 219, 221 (2019).
TrueAllele was first used for forensic analysis in the late 1990s, see History,
CYBERGENETICS, https://perma.cc/J2SK-NKHU (last visited May 24, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review), and was first used in a criminal case
in 2009, see Kirchner, supra note 42. Coming onto the scene somewhat later,
STRmix was first used for casework in August of 2012. See What Can STRmix
Do?, STRMIX, https://perma.cc/789D-2AW2 (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
132. These are “probabilistic genotyping” programs. Kirchner, supra note 42.
Analysts employ these programs when working with evidence that includes DNA
mixtures—those containing DNA from multiple individuals. See Logan Koepke,
Should Secret Code Help Convict?, CRIM. JUST., Mar. 24, 2016 (“TrueAllele
Casework is a proprietary computer program that parses DNA mixtures—samples
that include genetic code from more than one person.”).
133. See Coble & Bright, supra note 131, at 220–21; Keopke, supra note 132
(explaining that “TrueAllele looks to pick up where most forensic labs would leave
off”).
134. See Coble & Bright, supra note 131, at 221 (“These models take the
quantitative information from the DNA profile and calculate the probability of
the peak heights given all the possible genotype combinations for the individual
contributors.”); see Koepke, supra note 132. As Logan Koepke has explained with
respect to TrueAllele, these programs “compare the actual DNA data to different
statistical models, weighing the probability that the data matches the model,” and
they “do[] this by examining 100,000 different combinations of possible variables
and how well each proposed variable might explain the DNA data.” Koepke, supra
note 132.
135. See Koepke, supra note 132 (“Essentially, algorithms compare the actual
DNA data to different statistical models, weighing the probability that the data
matches the model.”).
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the analysis, and because the underlying source code carries out
the calculations, the details of the process are largely unknown to
the DNA analysts employing the program. 136 Not surprisingly, the
criminal defendants involved, as well as their lawyers, are
similarly generally unaware of how these PGSs reach their
advanced match determinations.
Despite criminal justice actors’ lack of understanding about
the intricacies of these PGSs, uses of TrueAllele and STRmix
analyses to support criminal convictions have skyrocketed. 137 As of
April 2015, TrueAllele evidence had been used to convict criminal
defendants “in over 500 cases . . . with the majority of those
convictions occurring during the previous full year.” 138 Prosecutors
are also using STRmix to secure convictions, 139 although the
numbers are less clear here, as STRmix is relatively new to the
field. Although STRmix was first admitted in a U.S. court in only
December 2015, 140 some jurisdictions are already switching from

136. As Michael Coble and Jo-Anne Bright have stated, the “software should
not be treated as a ‘black box’ where something magical happens to generate the
statistic.” Coble & Bright, supra note 131, at 223. “It is imperative the end user
understand the underlying mathematics (at least to a conceptual level),
assumptions, models and limitations of the software program to convey how the
program works to the trier of fact.” Id. This is a challenge, though, as many
examiners have been trained to analyze DNA using a different framework. See
id. (“Transitioning to the [Likelihood Ratio] and understanding the nuances of
building relevant propositions based upon case scenarios can be challenging to
users accustomed to a frequentist view of probability.”).
137. See Darlene Dang, DNA Software Claims to Prevent Wrongful
Convictions, but Lacks Third-Party Validation, HUFF. POST (Apr. 7, 2016, 4:40
PM), https://perma.cc/Q7WU-2DB9 (last updated Apr. 7, 2017) (last visited Oct.
4, 2019) (“This groundbreaking technology helped convict criminals in over 500
cases in the past five years, with the majority of those convictions occurring last
year.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
138. Id.
139. See Kirchner, supra note 42 (“The U.S. Army and the FBI use
STRmix . . . as do several public crime labs across the nation.”).
140. See John S. Hausman, Michigan Judge’s Landmark DNA Ruling Could
Revolutionize CSI Work, MLIVE (Dec. 23, 2015), https://perma.cc/PKN6-SWXQ
(last updated Jan. 19, 2019) (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) (referring to STRmix and
stating that “a Michigan judge has made the nation’s first ruling on a new
approach to analyzing DNA results that could revolutionize crime-scene
investigation and court cases”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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TrueAllele to STRmix, so STRmix’s numbers are already on the
rise. 141
B. The Especially Troubling Nature of Conviction Programs
Conviction programs like those powering breathalyzers,
AFISs, and PGSs are fundamentally different from the prediction
programs that critics continue to attack and that have received
more significant attention. Prediction programs focus on human
behavior—roughly assessing the probability that a particular
offender will, for example, recidivate. 142 Conviction programs, on
the other hand, do not focus on behavior in this way. Instead, they
measure in some approximate sense the probability that the
individual in question has a particular biological characteristic.
What is the blood or breath alcohol content of the defendant? What
are the characteristics—the “minutiae”—of the defendant’s
fingerprints? Are his alleles the same as the alleles found in the
DNA sample found at the crime scene? Whereas prediction
programs draw on the social sciences—they are supposedly based
on studies about how certain past conditions have affected human
behavior 143—conviction programs at least purportedly draw from
the hard sciences. DNA analysis is the best example of this; it is
the “gold standard” for modern-day forensic evidence. 144 The study
of DNA grew out of the biology, chemistry, and biochemistry
departments of universities. 145 And scientists across the globe
141. See Kirchner, supra note 42 (“New York City’s Office of the Chief Medical
Examiner recently announced that it will switch to STRmix in 2017.”).
142. See supra Part II.A.
143. See, e.g., NORTHPOINTE, supra note 51, at 26–46 (describing the social
science underlying the secret prediction algorithm embedded in COMPAS).
144. See DONALD E. SHELTON, FORENSIC SCIENCE EVIDENCE: CAN THE LAW
KEEP UP WITH SCIENCE? 190 (2012) (“The prosecution use of DNA in criminal
cases has become the new ‘gold standard’ of criminal identification techniques.”);
NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
A PATH FORWARD 130 (2009) (stating that DNA is “the standard against which
many other forensic individualization techniques are [now] judged”). But see ERIN
MURPHY, INSIDE THE CELL: THE DARK SIDE OF FORENSIC DNA xii (2015) (explaining
that, although DNA offers “innumerable benefits” for the criminal justice system,
caution must be used in employing and relying on DNA analysis).
145. See NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., supra note 144, at 130; see also Meghan J.
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study DNA and related areas. To the average person, however,
DNA analysis is cloaked in mystery. With prosecutors’ arguments
and experts’ testimony often providing random match probabilities
smaller than one in several billion or trillion, 146 DNA evidence
seems almost bullet-proof. But, in the difficult DNA cases—those
involving low-level samples or complex mixtures of multiple
individuals’ DNA and thus requiring PGS analysis—underneath
those probabilities are the algorithms and source codes of the
computer programs calculating the relevant statistics. And the
forensic examiner ordinarily is unaware of the nuances of these
algorithms and source codes.
Although it is no secret that there is some uncertainty in
prediction, the way that prosecutors present evidence related to
conviction is often on the level of certainty. 147 For example,
fingerprint examiners, whose conclusions are often based on AFIS
outcomes, generally testify as to whether there is a “match” or “no
match” rather than testifying about the probability that the
fingerprint found at the crime scene came from the criminal
defendant in the case. 148 This level of certainty by examiners is
rampant in the areas of forensic study. 149 Similarly, onlookers
Ryan, Miranda’s Truth: The Importance of Adversarial Testing and Dignity in
Confession Law, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 413, 428 (2017) (“DNA evidence is thought to
be incredibly reliable, due in part to its development from the research culture of
universities . . . .”).
146. See BUTLER, supra note 129, at 247, 251.
147. See Joseph B. Kadane & Jonathan J. Koehler, Certainty & Uncertainty
in Reporting Fingerprint Evidence, DAEDALUS, Fall 2018, at 120 (“Although the
ACE-V process is subjective, fingerprint examiners have historically claimed that
their identifications are 100 percent certain, and that there is virtually no chance
that an error has occurred.”).
148. See NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., supra note 144, at 141–42 (explaining that
“SWGFAST has promulgated three acceptable conclusions resulting from latent
print comparison: individualization (or identification), exclusion, or inconclusive”
and that, “when a latent print examiner testifies that two impressions ‘match,’
they are communicating the notion that the prints could not possibly have come
from two different individuals”). But cf. Guideline for the Articulation of the
Decision-Making Process Leading to an Expert Opinion of Source Identification in
Friction Ridge Examinations (draft), ORG. OF SCI. AREA COMMS. FOR FORENSIC SCI.,
at 9–10, https://perma.cc/F8SX-WGSY (PDF) (providing that the examiner’s level
of confidence in a fingerprint identification determination “shall not be reported
in absolute terms and should not be reported numerically”).
149. See Danielle Weiss & Gerald Laporte, Uncertainty Ahead: A Shift in How
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often perceive DNA evidence as iron-clad, indisputable evidence
against the accused. 150 Although DNA analysts will testify about
the probability that a random individual’s DNA would match the
sample DNA found at the crime scene or in another potentially
incriminating location, these estimates do not take into account
the chance that there was a mistake in the lab or that leaving DNA
at the crime scene does not necessarily mean guilt. 151 Further,
these DNA experts’ probability statements are so significant that
factfinders regularly consider them conclusive. 152 This is in
addition to decisionmakers regularly falling prey to the
prosecutor’s fallacy, whereby they mistake the random match
probability with the probability that the defendant is not guilty. 153
Federal Scientific Experts Can Testify, 279 NAT’L INST. OF JUST. J. 1, 1 (2018)
(explaining that, for decades, scientific experts have asserted that their expert
opinions are to a “reasonable degree of scientific certainty”).
150. See Kadane & Koehler, supra note 147, at 120–21.
151. See Meghan J. Ryan, The Privacy, Probability, and Political Pitfalls of
Universal DNA Collection, 20 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 3, 18 (2017); Meghan J.
Ryan, Remedying Wrongful Execution, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 261, 274 n.89
(2012) (“[W]hile DNA evidence can be ‘uniquely probative’ of a defendant’s
innocence, it is not conclusive. For example, the defendant may not have left
behind any of his DNA, and the trace DNA evidence examined could belong to his
partner or an innocent individual.” (internal citations omitted)); Ryan & Adams,
supra note 63, at 1083 (“Errors can still occur with respect to DNA
evidence. . . . For example, laboratory tests can be mislabeled or contaminated,
and an analyst could make a mistake or even possibly fabricate results.”); Ryan,
supra note 145, at 430 (explaining that “there can be cross-contamination in the
laboratory, the forensic scientist may err in running the samples or interpreting
the results, or the forensic scientist may lie about the results”). Appropriate
testimony on the part of the prosecutor would refer to “the probability of selecting
the observed profile from a population of random unrelated individuals . . . based
on the alleles present in [the] sample” rather than the “chance that the DNA
profile came from someone else” or the “chance that a defendant is not guilty.” See
BUTLER, supra note 129, at 251. The latter two approaches are known as the
prosecutor’s fallacy. See id. (providing examples of the prosecutor’s fallacy, such
as stating that “there is only a 1 in 15,000 chance that the defendant is not
guilty”).
152. See BUTLER, supra note 129, at 2 (“Thousands of cases have been closed
with guilty suspects punished and innocent ones freed because of the power of a
silent biological witness at the crime scene.”); Kadane & Koehler, supra note 147,
at 120–21.
153. See James S. Liebman et al., The Evidence of Things Not Seen:
Non-Matches as Evidence of Innocence, 98 IOWA L. REV. 577, 615 (2013)
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Prosecutors’ presentations of conviction program evidence as
virtually infallible is especially troubling considering that
arguably more is at stake with conviction programs. Unlike the
prediction programs used to make bail, sentencing, and parole
decisions, conviction programs affect determinations of guilt and
innocence. In this regard, convicting an innocent person is often
considered more concerning than imposing, for example, an
inaccurate or unjust sentence. 154 Bail, sentencing, and parole
decisions are of course important. They affect who is detained and
how severely an offender is punished. In this sense, they
potentially affect an individual’s liberty and the stigma attached
to detention and punishment severity. But they do not go to the
heart of conviction. Certainly, unjust sentences are deeply
undesirable, but a sentence that is too harsh is arguably not as
terrible as wrongly convicting an innocent person. 155 In this sense,
decisions about conviction are more important than sentencing
decisions. 156 Similarly, a person who has been arrested and denied
bail may have a more difficult time preparing for trial than
someone who has not been denied bail, and this may negatively
affect this individual’s probability of being convicted. 157 But the
(describing the prosecutor’s fallacy).
154. This is debatable, and other commentators do not agree with me on this
point. I think that wrongful conviction is a greater wrong than a sentence that is
too harsh because, with wrongful conviction, the defendant is completely
innocent, whereas, with too harsh of a sentence, the defendant is a wrongdoer and
has run afoul of the law in some way. Still, certain defendants will almost
certainly disagree with this point. To some defendants, especially guilty repeat
offenders, the sentence is the most important aspect of a criminal proceeding.
They have already committed the crime, and now they just want to do their time
and get out. Regardless of whether wrongful conviction is a worse wrong than
imposing too harsh of a punishment, though, wrongful conviction remains a
problem and the computer programs that create risks of wrongful convictions are
similarly problematic.
155. See supra note 154 (explaining this point further and noting that it is
debatable).
156. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (noting that this is debatable
and that acceptance of this proposition is not central to this Article’s thesis).
157. See Melanie D. Wilson, The Price of Pretrial Release: Can We Afford to
Keep Our Fourth Amendment Rights?, 92 IOWA L. REV. 159, 194 (2006) (“Because
the judge’s decision to detain an arrested person has the capacity to alter her
ability to prepare her case for trial and, thereby, impair a defendant’s fair-trial
process, pretrial waivers used to gain pretrial freedom are important.”).
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denial of bail likely does not have as great of an impact on
conviction than, say, DNA evidence implicating the defendant.
Indeed, DNA evidence, breathalyzer results, and fingerprint
matches are ordinarily particularly damning evidence in a case. 158
One significant reason for this is that each of these types of
evidence is often viewed as incredibly reliable and accurate, rooted
in science, and providing valid, objective evidence of guilt. 159
IV. Accuracy and Secrecy Intertwined
Although much is at stake where convictions are involved, and
although prosecutors regularly present evidence produced by
conviction programs as nearly indisputable, there are real
questions about the accuracy of the outputs that these conviction
programs produce and that prosecutors rely on so heavily today.
158. See JOHN BUGLIOSI, THE ART OF PROSECUTION: TRIAL ADVOCACY
FUNDAMENTALS FROM CASE PREPARATION THROUGH SUMMATION 12 (2000) (“DNA
has surpassed fingerprints as the single most damning evidence in a criminal
case.”); Aurora J. Wilson, Discovery of Breathalyzer Source Code in DUI
Prosecutions, 7 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 121, 122 (2011) (“Breathalyzer test
results commonly provide critical evidence in cases involving charges for driving
under the influence (DUI) or driving while intoxicated (DWI).”); Michael Specter,
Do Fingerprints Lie?, NEW YORKER (May 19, 2002), https://perma.cc/CW8D-MS7X
(last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (explaining that the current culture is that, if “[y]ou
are indicted on the basis of a fingerprint . . . [y]ou are [no longer] innocent till
proven guilty” and that, “if the police have a print, you are assumed to be guilty”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
159. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 144, at 130 (“[D]NA typing is now
universally recognized as the standard against which many other forensic
individualization techniques are judged. DNA enjoys this preeminent position
because of its reliability and the fact that, absent fraud or an error in labeling or
handling, the probabilities of a false positive are quantifiable and often
miniscule.”); BUGLIOSI, supra note 158, at 12; (describing DNA evidence as
“damning evidence in a criminal case”); MURPHY, supra note 144, at 85 (stating
that, with respect to DNA, “[m]any jurors, and even legal officials, hear the word
match as synonymous with case closed”); SHELTON, supra note 144, at 190
(describing DNA evidence as “the new ‘gold standard’ of criminal identification
techniques” because it has “a firm scientific foundation established outside of the
context of criminal litigation”); Specter, supra note 158 (“For more than a century,
the fingerprint has been regarded as an unassailable symbol of truth, particularly
in the courtroom. When a trained expert tells a judge and jury that prints found
at a crime scene match those of the accused, his testimony often decides the
case.”).
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For the most part, simply more research must be done to determine
whether these technologies produce accurate information on which
convictions should fairly be based. 160 Even if the developers of
these technologies were aware of inaccurate outputs, or of potential
inaccurate outputs, though, one wonders whether they would be
forthcoming about such defects, knowing that such revelations
could cause their revenues from these lucrative business products
to plummet. In any case, the incredible secrecy surrounding use of
these programs currently masks any answers that could be
gleaned by more closely examining these technologies. Shielding
these conviction programs from public—and even legal and
scientific—scrutiny translates into a situation in which criminal
defendants are being convicted based on evidence that has not
been clearly established as accurate. Burgeoning secrecy in the law
generally, and laypersons’ misunderstandings and acceptance of
evidence presented as science, further exacerbate this concern of
unchallenged evidence in criminal cases.
A. The Interconnected Problems of Accuracy and Secrecy
The accuracy of evidence presented at trial—especially that
presented as “scientific” evidence—is important for the proper
working of, and faith in, our criminal justice system. 161 Where
computerized programs used for conviction are concerned, there
are significant questions about whether the programs’ outputs are
accurate and useful figures on which legal decisionmakers should
rely in assessing guilt and innocence. These questions about
accuracy are difficult to resolve, as the details of the
programs—the underlying algorithms and source codes—are
generally kept under lock and key by the companies that created
them and license them for government use in convicting criminal
160. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 14 (describing how the discipline of fingerprint
matching is severely wanting for a scientific foundation and setting forth some
necessary research that scientists and lawyers must conduct to shore up the
practice).
161. See id. (“Avoiding wrongful convictions—based on fingerprint or even
other questionable evidence—is critical, but one should not overlook the
importance of punishing guilty offenders. The legitimacy of criminal law depends
on it.”).
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defendants. This secrecy, paired with the pending accuracy
questions, is incredibly problematic.
1. Breathalyzers
Breathalyzers are a common example of a mainstream
technology for which there are real questions about accuracy. And
the secrecy surrounding the technology, as well as judicial refusal
to carefully examine whether breathalyzers produce valid
readings, exacerbate these accuracy questions. In most
jurisdictions today, defendants can be convicted of a driving-underthe-influence (DUI) or driving-while-intoxicated (DWI) offense by
simply blowing a certain value on a breathalyzer. 162 This would
constitute a per se violation of the relevant DUI or DWI statute. 163
Some reasons that jurisdictions have criminalized blowing certain
breathalyzer values—rather than just allowing those values to
serve as indirect evidence of blood alcohol concentration—relate to
the relative ease with which officers can conduct breath tests in
the field and the uncertainties surrounding conversions from
breath alcohol levels to the blood alcohol levels that might
otherwise be criminalized. 164 Such conversions can depend upon a
number of factors, 165 making breathalyzer values less accurate at
162. See Blood Alcohol Concentration Limits, supra note 117; see also People
v. Bransford, 884 P.2d 70, 72 (Cal. 1994) (“[T]he Legislature intended the statute
to criminalize the act of driving either with the specified blood-alcohol level or
with the specified breath-alcohol level.”). For example, California law provides
that “[i]t is unlawful for a person who has 0.08 percent or more, by weight, of
alcohol in his or her blood to drive a vehicle” and that this value “is based upon
grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
breath.” CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152(b) (West 2019).
163. See Blood Alcohol Concentration Limits, supra note 117 (“All 50 states
and the District of Columbia have per se laws defining it as a crime to drive with
a blood alcohol concentration . . . at or above a proscribed level, 0.08 percent.”).
164. See People v. Vangelder, 312 P.3d 1045, 1061 (Cal. 2013) (stating that
the amendment to the California statute “of the per se offense (§ 23152(b)) was
specifically designed to obviate the need for conversion of breath results into blood
results—and it rendered irrelevant and inadmissible defense expert testimony
regarding partition ratio variability among different individuals or at different
times for the same individual”).
165. See Bransford, 884 P.2d at 71 (“Many variables . . . can affect the actual
ratio of an individual’s breath-alcohol concentration to blood-alcohol
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determining whether a particular suspect has a certain blood
alcohol concentration. Rather than requiring proof of one’s actual
blood alcohol concentration in each case, it was a fairly simple
legislative solution to criminalize particular breathalyzer readings
in addition to blood alcohol concentrations. 166
Such absolute reliance on breathalyzers naturally makes the
accuracy of breathalyzers significant. As a result, some defense
lawyers in recent years have sought access to the source codes
upon which these machines rely. 167 As one defendant explained, in
these types of cases, the only good defense “is to go after the testing
method itself.” 168 If the source codes contain errors, or the
breathalyzer results are based on faulty algorithms, then the
resulting alcohol concentrations will likely be inaccurate. And
investigators have occasionally uncovered such errors. For
example, one expert found defects in breathalyzers regularly used
in New Jersey. 169 Because the breathalyzer failed to properly store
enough test values, it could report an inaccurate blood alcohol
concentration. These variables include body temperature, atmospheric pressure,
medical conditions, sex, and the precision of the measuring device.”).
166. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 23152 (West 2017 )(permitting prosecutors to
establish illegal blood alcohol content based on “grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
breath”).
167. See, e.g., State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 680–81 (Minn. 2009)
(recounting the efforts of defense attorneys in two consolidated appeals to obtain
source codes for the breathalyzers used in the underlying prosecutions).
168. Id. at 685.
169. See State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114, 157 (N.J. 2008) (explaining that one
“expert . . . identified a significant flaw in the [breathalyzer] program’s source
code that, in limited circumstances, can lead to an inaccurate reported BAC test
result” and that, although an opposing expert “disputed many of the conclusions
proffered by defendants’ experts, . . . he acknowledged and explained the buffer
overflow defect, admitting that he was responsible for the inclusion of this error
in the code”); see also Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 685 (explaining that one of the
appellants submitted a report “analyz[ing] the New Jersey machine’s computer
source code and uncover[ing] a variety of defects that could impact the test
result”). Further, research shows that improper use of breathalyzers can lead to
erroneous results. See Roth, supra 113, at 1999 (citing a report from the American
Prosecutors Research Institute and offering the example that “an operator of a
breath-alcohol machine who fails to wait long enough after a suspect vomits
before commencing the test runs the risk that the machine will mistake residual
mouth alcohol for alcohol in deep lung air and inaccurately estimate the suspect’s
blood-alcohol level”).
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concentration for a subject. 170 If more information about the
algorithms and source codes embedded in breathalyzer programs
were released, experts would almost certainly uncover more errors.
Such access to the underlying source codes and algorithms of
breathalyzers is necessary to secure reliable determinations of
guilt and innocence. 171
Despite this need for the program information that controls
breathalyzers, courts have generally refused to grant defendants
access to these algorithms and source codes. In many instances,
states premise discovery on the government’s possession of the
requested information. 172 As states often simply license use of the
proprietary technology from private companies, they lack this
information embedded in the breathalyzer programs. 173 In other
states, courts condition discovery on the government having better
access to the information than the defendant or on the prosecution
making its “best efforts” to obtain the information. 174 Courts have
170. See Chun, 943 A.2d at 157.
171. A number of states have limited breathalyzer results to those produced
by machines that have been previously approved or have put other front-end
protocols in place to improve accuracy and reliability. See Roth, supra note 113,
at 2016 (“Many states now limit the type of machines that can be used and enforce
operation protocols to ensure accurate results.”).
172. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01, subdiv. 2(1) (“On the defendant’s motion,
the court for good cause must require the prosecutor . . . to assist the defendant
in seeking access to specified matters relating to the case that are within the
possession or control of an official or employee of any governmental agency, but
not within the prosecutor’s control.”); see also Wilson, supra note 158, at 129
(explaining that “the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure treat possession of
requested evidence as dispositive for purposes of compliance with a motion for
discovery”—that, “[i]n effect, if the prosecution does not possess or control the
requested evidence, the government is not mandated to comply with the
defendant’s discovery motion”—and that “[t]his interpretation of [the] Federal
Rule[s] of Criminal Procedure . . . influences state court decisions in states where
the rules of criminal procedure are derived from the federal rules”).
173. Cf. Hills v. State, 663 S.E.2d 265, 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming the
trial court’s denial of defendant’s discovery request for breathalyzer source code
“because the state did not possess or control it”); Fargo v. Levine, 747 N.W.2d 130,
135 (S.D. 2008) (“We affirm the district court’s judgment, concluding the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying [defendant's] motion to compel
disclosure of the source code because [the defendant] failed to show Fargo had
possession, custody or control of the code.”).
174. See Wilson, supra note 158, at 131 (stating that, in Arizona, “the
defendant must show that the State has ‘better access to the information’ and
that the defense has made a ‘good faith effort to obtain the information without
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applied these seemingly more liberal rules narrowly, however, and,
again, have generally not allowed for defendants’ requested
discovery in these cases. 175 In still other states, courts have found
the underlying source codes and algorithms either irrelevant to the
cases at bar or have determined that defendants’ access to this
information was outweighed by the program developers’ business
interests. 176 Accordingly, most defendants have been unsuccessful
in obtaining the discovery necessary to effectively challenge
breathalyzer results. 177
Although defendants are generally unsuccessful in obtaining
access to information essential to assessing the accuracy of
breathalyzers, 178 one noteworthy case in which a defendant was
successful in this regard is State v. Underdahl, 179 which was
litigated in the Minnesota Supreme Court. 180 In that case, two
success’” and that “the New York criminal procedure laws require the prosecution
to make a ‘good faith effort’ to obtain material requested by the defendant even if
the material is not within the prosecution’s possession, custody or control”
(internal citations omitted)).
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id. at 129–32 (explaining that even “states with seemingly flexible
criminal procedure rules invariably arrive at a similar result as the majority:
breathalyzer source code is generally not subject to discovery because it is not in
the state’s possession, custody, or control, and the state is not better-positioned
to acquire the proprietary information”).
178. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Computer Source Code: A Source of the
Growing Controversy Over the Reliability of Automated Forensic Techniques, 66
DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 100 (2016) (noting that, “[w]ith few exceptions, the clear
majority of courts [have] rejected defendants’ requests that a defense expert be
granted access to the [breathalyzer’s] source code”); Wilson, supra note 158, at
123 (explaining that most courts refuse to grant defendants access to breathalyzer
source code because this “source code is the proprietary information of the
manufacturer and cannot therefore be in the possession, custody, or control of the
State”).
179. 767 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 2009).
180. Underdahl is part of a morass of Minnesota cases relating to the
discovery of breathalyzer source code. A Minnesota district court granted
Underdahl discovery on May, 2, 2006, which was the genesis of this litigation,
and which eventually resulted in a statewide examination of the accuracy and
reliability of breathalyzer evidence in Minnesota. See In re Source Code
Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d 525, 527 (Minn.
2012) (“This appeal involves a statewide challenge to the reliability of Intoxilyzer
5000EN test results based on alleged defects in the Intoxilyzer 5000EN source
code.”); see also In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 2007)
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defendants were separately charged with driving while intoxicated
when their breathalyzer tests indicated blood alcohol
concentrations 181 of 0.23 and 0.18. 182 Both defendants separately
requested discovery of the breathalyzer’s source code. 183 The
district courts in both cases granted the defendants’ discovery
requests, finding the source code relevant to the defendants’ guilt
or innocence. 184 On appeal, though, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed the district courts’
discovery orders. 185 Finally, the Minnesota Supreme Court
recognized that the breathalyzer’s source code could very well be
relevant in these cases, 186 and it reinstated the district court’s
order for discovery in one of the defendant’s cases. 187 With respect
to the other defendant, the court determined that the defendant
had not made enough of a showing of relevance to justify the

(denying the Commissioner of Public Safety’s request for a writ of prohibition to
prevent the district court’s enforcement of its order to disclose the breathalyzer
source code). By this time, “requests for discovery of the source code [had become]
part of standard litigation strategy in criminal DWI and implied consent
proceedings” in the state. In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied
Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d at 529. Ultimately, the Minnesota Supreme Court
upheld the district court determination that the breathalyzer results were
generally reliable. See id. at 528, 541–43; see also In re Source Code Evidentiary
Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, No. 70-CR-09-19749, 2011 WL 803997
(Minn. D. Ct. Mar. 08, 2011) (detailing the district court’s order).
181. The relevant statute does not specify whether the “alcohol concentration”
measures blood or breath alcohol concentration. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169A.20
(2017).
182. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 680.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 680–81. The district courts not only granted the discovery
requests, but they also ordered that, if the source code were not turned over within
thirty days, the breathalyzer evidence would be excluded and, at least in one case,
the charge would be dismissed. See id.
185. Id. at 681.
186. See id. at 686 (“[W]e hold that the district court in [one defendant’s] case
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the source code may relate to his
guilt or innocence.”).
187. See id. (finding that “the district court in [one of the defendant’s] case[s]
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the source code may relate to his
guilt or innocence”).
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discovery order. 188 This is even though the facts of the
cases—although not the requests for discovery—were similar. 189
Underdahl remains an outlier, and defendants generally
cannot gain access to the algorithms and source codes underlying
the computer program information propping up their
convictions. 190 Instead, the breathalyzer developers retain this
closely held information. Preserving developers’ proprietary
interests in the algorithms and source codes is thought to
incentivize innovators to develop these types of technologies and
support the competitiveness of the industry, but it weakens
defendants’ abilities to defend themselves in court. Today, despite
the opacity of their underlying algorithms and source codes,
breathalyzer results remain powerful evidence in court.
2. Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems
Automated fingerprint identification systems constitute
another genre of computer programs that helps prosecutors secure
criminal convictions. An AFIS relies on its internal algorithms,
and the computer source codes implementing those algorithms, to
match latent prints from crime scenes to exemplar
fingerprints—the known fingerprints on file. 191 Contrary to how
188. See Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 685–86. Justices Alan Page and Paul
Anderson concurred in part and dissented in part, objecting to the Supreme
Court’s affirmance of the Court of Appeal’s reversal of the production order with
respect to the second defendant, Dale Lee Underdahl. See id. at 687– 88 (Page, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. See id. at 680. In contrast to Underdahl’s discovery request, where he did
not offer any information or exhibits supporting the motion, “Brunner submitted
a memorandum and nine exhibits to support his request for the source code.” Id.
at 685. One of Brunner’s exhibits “was the written testimony of . . . a computer
science professor at the University of California in Berkeley, which explained the
source code in voting machines, the source code’s importance in finding defects
and problems in those machines, and the issues surrounding the source code’s
disclosure.” Id. Another exhibit “detailed Brunner’s attempts to obtain the source
code, both from the State and [the breathalyzer manufacturer].” Id. Yet another
exhibit “was a copy of a report prepared on behalf of the defendants in New Jersey
litigation about the reliability of New Jersey’s breath-test machine.” Id.
190. See Wilson, supra note 158, at 123.
191. See generally NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE
FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK ch. 6, https://perma.cc/JC9T-5H2Z (PDF).
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AFISs are depicted on television and in the movies, though, these
programs do not actually exactly match prints. In fact, such perfect
matches are nearly impossible, as any individual’s finger will print
differently depending on the mechanics of touch and the properties
of the surface touched. 192 Instead, AFISs provide authorities with
a number of possible matches, and human fingerprint examiners
are the ones to actually declare matches and testify to them in
court. 193 The accuracy and reliability of AFISs remain important,
however, because, as has recently become apparent, there are real
questions about the abilities of fingerprint examiners to discern
fingerprint matches from non-matches or inconclusive results. 194
It seems, then, that these examiners rely quite heavily on AFIS
results, thus rendering AFIS conviction programs similar to
breathalyzers in regularly fortifying criminal convictions.
Despite the important role that AFISs play in the ultimate
conviction of criminal defendants, experts know very little about
the accuracy of AFISs. Outside of the companies developing these
products and the government agencies purchasing or licensing the
technology, very few individuals, if any, have raised the concern
that these programs may not produce accurate results. 195 In fact,
192. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 144, at 137. The National Academy
of Sciences report explains that a number of factors contribute to fingerprint
impressions, including: the “[c]ondition of the skin,” “[t]ype of residue,”
“[m]echanics of touch,” “[n]ature of the surface touched,” “[d]evelopment
technique,” “[c]apture technique,” and “[s]ize of the latent print or the percentage
of the surface that is available for comparison.” Id. at 137–38.
193. See NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, supra note 191, at 6–27.
194. See Specter, supra note 158. Notably, over half of the practicing or
would-be fingerprint examiners who take the International Association of
Identification’s certification test fail it. See Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber,
Error Rates for Human Latent Fingerprint Examiners, in AUTOMATIC
FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 354 (Nalina Ratha & Ruud Bolle, eds. 2004)
(noting “that about half the applicants for certification fail the test on the basis of
poor fingerprint matching skills”); see also Andy Newman, Fingerprinting’s
Reliability Draws Growing Court Challenges, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2001),
https://perma.cc/AUB5-6JSV (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (“The accuracy of making
identifications from dusted or latent prints, which are often smudged, distorted
or fragmentary, has never been scientifically tested.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
195. But cf. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI., supra note 144, at 142–43 (“Although there
is limited information about the accuracy and reliability of friction ridge analyses,
claims that these analyses have zero error rates are not scientifically plausible.”).
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it seems that accuracy is not necessarily the goal in AFIS
functioning. Take the FBI’s current AFIS program, for example.
While the FBI requests figures on the validity of these programs,
neither its purchasing agents nor its fingerprint examiners are
exactly sure how the program produces the possible matches that
it generates. 196 The FBI’s current program produces a handful of
possible matches from the database for each latent fingerprint
inputted into the system. 197 It will produce these possible matches
regardless of whether there is a 1% or a 99% similarity between
the latent print and each of the closest “matches” 198 in the
database. 199 The program does not produce any useful data for the
user about how similar the internal database exemplar prints are
to the inputted latent prints. 200 While researchers have played
with “similarity scores,” attempting to quantify how close alleged
matches are, there is no consensus as to how to measure similarity,
so similarity scores are just assessments of similarity according to
a particular researcher’s, or programmer’s, own assessment of
similarity. 201
After AFIS has generated a number of potential matches, the
operator then turns over these results to a fingerprint examiner to
determine with (alleged) certainty whether one of the
program-produced “likely” exemplar prints actually matches the
latent print. 202 Again, the fingerprint examiner’s ability to do this
196. See Interview with James Loudermilk, supra note 118; see also supra
note 119 (noting that the FBI declined to comment).
197. See Interview with James Loudermilk, supra note 118.
198. The determination that these three prints are the closest matches to the
latent print are according to the proprietary algorithm, the details of which
remain secret. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.; see also infra note 205 (noting that a similarity score is “just ‘an
artificial construct of the algorithm’”).
201. See Ryan, supra note 14 (“[T]here are multiple ways to assess print
similarity, depending on how that term is defined. The probability that prints
share the same source . . . is a more complicated question.”).
202. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. It is important to note that
there are significant questions about the validity and reliability of fingerprint
examiners’ determinations of fingerprint matches. Their methods are
unscientific, and some studies have shown that their reliability is wanting. See
Ryan, supra note 14; cf. 5 DAVID FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE:
THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 32.1 (2018) (“[S]urprisingly little
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in an accurate and reliable manner remains questionable. 203
Further, the fingerprint examiner—who is the individual
ultimately testifying in court—is generally unfamiliar with the
AFIS technology providing him with a persuasive starting point
for his analysis. 204 Although AFIS provides the examiner with a
limited number of possibilities for a match, the examiner is
generally unaware of how the technology has chosen these
particular fingerprints as the possible matches from the database,
and he is also unaware of how similar the “likely” matches are. 205
Also like breathalyzers, AFISs are generally shrouded in
secrecy. Again, the companies that develop these computer
programs often do not want to release the details of their
algorithms or underlying source codes because this would nullify
their legal monopolies over the programs; it would hurt their
business interests. 206 Because this information is generally
unavailable to the public, to criminal defendants, and even to the
primary users of the program—law enforcement officers and
fingerprint examiners—it seems that no defendants have ever
challenged the matching programs on which their fingerprint
matches are based. This lack of challenges may also result from
the fact that, unlike breathalyzer evidence, AFIS matches are a
step removed from prosecutors’ court cases against these
conventional science exists to support the claims of the fingerprint examination
community.”). Further, fingerprint examiners are generally not blinded from the
already-developed facts of the case—from who the suspect is, how gruesome the
crime was, the identity of the victim, etc.—making them susceptible to bias,
whether conscious or unconscious. See Sue Russell, Bias and the Big Fingerprint
Dust-Up, PAC. STANDARD (June 18, 2009), https://perma.cc/7S3R-D9TY (last
updated Oct. 31, 2018) (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
203. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 14 (“[E]ven the FBI does not have access to
the underlying algorithm and source code that produces the closest fingerprint
matches . . . .”).
205. See Interview with James Loudermilk, supra note 118; see also supra
note 119 (noting that the FBI declined to comment). Although the program
provides the user with similarity scores, these scores are just “an artificial
construct of the algorithm”; similarity is assessed according to the secret
algorithm’s own definition of “similarity.” Interview with James Loudermilk,
supra note 118; supra notes 200–201 and accompanying text.
206. See Interview with James Loudermilk, supra note 118.
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defendants. And even more basic challenges to fingerprint
examiners’ match conclusions and resulting court testimony have
been repeatedly shot down by courts across the nation. 207
Throughout history, not a single criminal defendant in the United
States has found success in challenging the art of fingerprinting. 208
207. See Ryan, supra note 14.
208. In 2002, there was, briefly, a success story of a defendant having a
fingerprint examiner’s expert testimony against him excluded. See Paul C.
Giannelli, Fingerprints Challenged, 17 CRIM. JUST. 33, 33 (2002). In United States
v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (withdrawn from bound
volume), vacated and superseded by United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d
549 (E.D. Pa. 2002), Pennsylvania District Court Judge Louis H. Pollak initially
determined that the fingerprint examiner’s testimony against the
defendant—who was being tried on various “drug and murder charges,” Llera
Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 550—was inadmissible. See Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp.
2d at 517–18. The district court concluded that:
The parties will be able to present expert fingerprint testimony (1)
describing how any latent and rolled prints at issue in this case were
obtained, (2) identifying, and placing before the jury, such fingerprints
and any necessary magnifications, and (3) pointing out any observed
similarities and differences between a particular latent print and a
particular rolled print alleged by the government to be attributable to
the same persons. But the parties will not be permitted to present
testimony expressing an opinion of an expert witness that a particular
latent print matches, or does not match, the rolled print of a particular
person and hence is, or is not, the fingerprint of that person.
Id. Judge Pollak reached his singular conclusion by carefully examining the
details of this particular forensic science discipline and applying the controlling
Daubert standard rather than just presuming that fingerprint examiner
testimony was admissible because of its long historical pedigree. See id. at
494–517. He determined that there was little, if any, scientific testing
establishing the “reliability of fingerprints,” id. at 506–08 (“On the record made
in Mitchell, the government had little success in identifying scientific testing that
tended to establish the reliability of fingerprint identifications.”), that fingerprint
examination “had not been sufficiently subjected to the peer review [and
publication] process,” Ryan, supra note 14; see also Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d
at 508–09 (noting that any publications had not truly been subjected to scientific
scrutiny and stating that “[i]t would . . . be a misnomer to call fingerprint
examiners a ‘scientific community’ in the Daubert sense), and that fingerprint
identifications further failed the next Daubert factor considering “the known or
potential rate of error . . . and the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique’s operation,” see Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 509–14.
While fingerprint identifications are generally accepted, the district court
explained that “the failure of fingerprint identifications fully to satisfy the first
three Daubert factors militates against heavy reliance on the general acceptance
factor,” id. at 515, and that general acceptance cannot “by itself . . . sustain the
government’s burden in making the case for the admissibility of fingerprint
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3. Probabilistic Genotyping Systems
As with breathalyzers, AFISs, and other technologies, there
are real concerns about the accuracy of PGSs like TrueAllele and
STRmix. In 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science
and Technology (PCAST) reviewed the use of forensic sciences in
the United States, including PGSs such as TrueAllele and
STRmix. 209 Although PCAST recognized that these approaches to
testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.” Id. This radical skeptical view of
fingerprint identifications “sent reverberations across the criminal justice
community—but not for long.” Ryan, supra note 14. Judge Pollak reversed his
decision just two months later. See Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, vacating and
superseding Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (withdrawn from bound volume);
Ryan, supra note 14. He “explained that, upon reconsideration, it seemed that,
although fingerprint examination is not scientific, it is a technical discipline and,
in that sense, there has been sufficient peer review and publication and sufficient
knowledge of error rate and maintenance of standards under Daubert.” Ryan,
supra note 14; see Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 571. “The ‘testing’ factor of
Daubert was still not met, but this, the court determined, would not prevent the
admissibility of testimony on fingerprint identifications.” Ryan, supra note 14; see
Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 571–72. Judge Pollak explained that, “[t]o
postpone present in-court utilization of this ‘bedrock forensic identifier’ pending
such [useful] research would be to make the best the enemy of the good.” Llera
Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d at 572. This “was the end of the brief victory by criminal
defendants over the questionable practice of admitting ‘expert’ testimony on
fingerprint identifications.” Ryan, supra note 14. As I have explained elsewhere,
“[s]ince Judge Pollak’s brave analysis in his initial opinion carefully analyzing the
forensic discipline under Daubert, there have been no other even slightly
successful challenges to this evidence in court.” Id. Instead, “[j]udges seem to have
taken a uniform stance in admitting this evidence despite the questions about the
accuracy and reliability of the human fingerprint examiners and the [opaque]
AFISs on which they rely as important starting points for their examinations.”
Id. Without much success challenging fingerprint evidence in general, there has
been little incentive for defendants to broaden their challenges to include access
to the algorithms and source codes underlying AFIS results that contribute to
fingerprint examiners’ analyses.
209. See generally PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH.,
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (Sept. 2016), https://perma.cc/A7EF-2NJC (PDF)
(reviewing forensic science methods as used in U.S. Courts, including examining
the uses of PGSs). This goes hand-in-hand with the FBI’s recent notice to
laboratories that federal data they had been using in calculating probabilities as
related to DNA mixtures was erroneous. See Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Notifies Crime
Labs of Errors Used in DNA Match Calculations Since 1999, WASH. POST (May
29, 2015), https://perma.cc/8FFH-949L (last visited Oct. 12, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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analyzing DNA mixtures are an improvement over more subjective
methods of analyzing mixtures—methods that require examiners
to make assumptions about which alleles to include and exclude in
the probability calculations—it also expressed concerns about
blindly relying on these computer-based approaches. 210 PCAST
explained:
These probabilistic genotyping software programs clearly
represent a major improvement over purely subjective
interpretation. However, they still require careful scrutiny to
determine (1) whether the methods are scientifically valid,
including defining the limitations on their reliability (that is,
the circumstances in which they may yield unreliable results)
and (2) whether the software correctly implements the methods.
This is particularly important because the programs employ
different mathematical algorithms and can yield different
results for the same mixture profile. 211

PCAST’s concern about accuracy is very real. TrueAllele and
STRmix have produced conflicting results in certain cases. 212 In
New York v. Hillary, 213 for example, TrueAllele results suggested
that defendant Hillary was not at the murder scene, whereas
STRmix results placed him there. 214 Further, experts found a
coding error in the STRmix software in the midst of a criminal trial
in New Zealand. 215 This important observation likely would have
210. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 209,
at 79.
211. Id.
212. See Augenstein, supra note 9; Kirchner, supra note 42.
213. No. 2015-15 (St. Lawrence County Aug. 26, 2016).
214. See Augenstein, supra note 9.
215. See Kirchner, supra note 42; David Murray, Queensland Authorities
Confirm ‘Miscode’ Affects DNA Evidence in Criminal Cases, THE COURIER-MAIL,
(Mar. 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/6RLC-SN72 (last visited Jan. 21, 2020) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also STATEMENT RELATING TO
STRMIX™ MISCODES, FRIDAY, 18 MARCH 2016, https://perma.cc/53X8-PJ4R (PDF)
(announcing the coding error); see also Roth, supra note 113, at 2024–25 (stating
that “[STRmix’s] creators have had to disclose publicly multiple episodes of
miscodes potentially affecting match statistics”). Perhaps suggesting similar
problems, “TrueAllele’s creator Mark Perlin has executed over twenty-five
revisions to its 170,000+ lines of source code, with no published documentation as
to what has been revised or why.” Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J.
1245, 1273 (2016); see also Natalie Ram, Innovating Criminal Justice, 112 NW. U.
L. REV. 659, 681 (2018) (suggesting that these changes may have “corrected
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gone unnoticed if the underlying source code and algorithm had
remained entirely secret. These examples raise the very serious
question about which results, if any, should be trusted.
Despite different PGSs producing conflicting results, the
creators of these programs still tout the programs’ accuracy and
usefulness. Cybergenetics founder and creator of TrueAllele, Mark
Perlin, boasts about the improved accuracy of his program over
traditional DNA analyses 216 and claims that TrueAllele “is
validated to [the level of] five [DNA mixture] contributors in
various scientific publications.” 217 Importantly, though, the studies
and reviews justifying this claim of accuracy were conducted by
Cybergenetics or its shareholders. 218 As the lead author on one of
these studies, for example, Perlin disclosed that he “is a
shareholder, officer and employee of Cybergenetics . . . [which]
manufactures the patented TrueAllele® Casework system, and
provides expert testimony about DNA case results.” 219 The second
and third authors on the article were also at the time “current or
former employees of Cybergenetics.” 220 This is a clear conflict of
interest. Perlin’s claims of program accuracy are not unique,
undisclosed errors or inadvertently introduced new ones”).
216. See Augenstein, supra note 9. This is not inconsistent with the PCAST
report, which similarly stated that “[t]hese probabilistic genotyping software
programs clearly represent a major improvement over purely subjective
interpretation.” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note
209, at 79.
217. Augenstein, supra note 9. According to Perlin, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) “pretends” that TrueAllele must be further
validated or that “there is a problem” with TrueAllele in order to secure funding
for the organization. Id. He has further argued that NIST is “biased and lack[s]
expertise.” Id. As for PCAST, Perlin has suggested that the “report is
well-intentioned, but misguided,” and that “[f]orensics needs better science, not
more bureaucracy.” Id.
218. See id.; see also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra
note 209, at 80 (“[M]ost of the studies evaluating software packages have been
undertaken by the software developers themselves.”). But see Imwinkelried,
supra note 178, at 121 (suggesting that the number of validation studies
demonstrating the accuracy of the TrueAllele software is sufficient, at least when
the software is used under certain conditions).
219. Mark W. Perlin et al., TrueAllele Casework on Virginia DNA Mixture
Evidence: Computer and Manual Interpretation in 72 Reported Criminal Cases, 9
PLOS ONE 3, 1 (2014).
220. Id.
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though. STRmix developer John Buckleton has similarly argued
that his program is well validated and that PCAST reached
improper conclusions based on inadequate research. 221 PCAST has
explained that, although “[a] number of papers have been
published that analyze known mixtures in order to address
[accuracy and related concerns],” several points must be made. 222
“First, most of the studies evaluating [these] software packages
have been undertaken by the software developers themselves.
While it is completely appropriate for method developers to
evaluate their own methods, establishing scientific validity also
requires scientific evaluation by other scientific groups that did not
develop the method.” 223 PCAST also pointed out that “there have
been few comparative studies across the methods to evaluate the
differences among them” and the few that have been conducted
were not by uninterested, independent groups. 224 “Most
importantly,” PCAST explained:
[C]urrent studies have adequately explored only a limited range
of mixture types (with respect to number of contributors, ratio
of minor contributors, and total amount of DNA). The two most
widely used methods (STRMix and TrueAllele) appear to be
reliable within a certain range, based on the available evidence
and the inherent difficulty of the problem. Specifically, these
methods appear to be reliable for three-person mixtures in
which the minor contributor constitutes at least 20 percent of
the intact DNA in the mixture and in which the DNA amount
exceeds the minimum level required for the method. . . . For
more complex mixtures (e.g. more contributors or lower
proportions), there is relatively little published evidence. In
human molecular genetics, an experimental validation of an
important diagnostic method would typically involve hundreds
of distinct samples. 225
221. See Augenstein, supra note 9. In response to the PCAST report,
Buckleton provided PCAST with a list of publications validating STRmix. See id.
As with TrueAllele, these publications were authored by individuals with a
financial interest in the technology.
222. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., supra note 209, at
80–81.
223. Id. at 80.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 80–81. The report further stated that “[o]ne forensic scientist told
PCAST that many more distinct samples have, in fact, been analyzed, but that
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TrueAllele and STRmix continue to maintain, though, that their
technologies are validated for analyzing more than three-person
mixtures, 226 and forensic scientists regularly use these programs
on these more complex mixtures.
One of the primary reasons that experts have not investigated
the accuracy of PGSs more thoroughly is that the developers of
these programs have vigilantly guarded their programs as trade
secrets. As with other creators of conviction programs, PGS
developers like Cybergenetics and Buckleton claim that secrecy is
necessary to preserve their property rights. 227 Indeed, if the source
code or algorithm were made public, the program would become
vulnerable to copycats that could purloin market share. Because of
this secrecy, researchers have difficulty gaining access to the
algorithms and source codes that could inform accuracy
determinations. 228 Further, because licensing the programs is
expensive, it is difficult for researchers to even engage in
validation exercises that could be useful for assessing accuracy.
Not only does this secrecy make it difficult for researchers to
examine PGSs, but it makes it nearly impossible for criminal
defendants and their attorneys to challenge this evidence when
prosecutors present it in court. As commentators have explained,
“[w]ithout the programming code, defense attorneys are unable to

the data have not yet been collated and published.” Id. at 81. PCAST then urged
forensic scientists and scientific journals to work together “to publish high-quality
validation studies that properly establish the range of reliability of methods for
the analysis of complex DNA mixtures.” Id. PCAST explained that this is
necessary “[b]ecause empirical evidence is essential for establishing the
foundational validity of a method.” Id.
226. See Augenstein, supra note 9.
227. See Dang, supra note 137. Cybergenetics has consistently refused to
reveal its source code or details about its algorithm, and judges have also refused
to order discovery here. See Kirchner, supra note 42 (“Defendants’ requests to get
access to TrueAllele’s source code have consistently been denied, leading the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, an advocacy group, to kick off a FOIA
campaign to obtain whatever information is publicly available from the
jurisdictions that use it.”). Professor Natalie Ram stated that, at least as of 2018,
“no one outside of Perlin’s company has seen or examined TrueAllele’s source
code.” Ram, supra note 215, at 677.
228. Cf. Dang, supra note 137 (“[W]ithout the code, there is no way of verifying
that True Allele is as accurate as Cybergenetics claims.”).
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challenge the accuracy of TrueAllele” and other PGSs. 229
“Likewise, prosecutors can’t authenticate it.” 230 The same is true
with respect to the appropriateness of the underlying algorithm.
This concern that secrecy leaves defense attorneys unable to
challenge the accuracy of a program like TrueAllele was the claim
made by Michael Robinson, a man on trial for murder in
Pennsylvania in 2013. 231 Part of the evidence against Robinson
was a match to his DNA found on a bandana near the crime
scene. 232 Examiners cultivated this DNA evidence by analyzing the
complex sample with TrueAllele. 233 The results were staggering
and damning: The TrueAllele analysis determined that the DNA
found on the bandana “was 5.6 billion times more likely” to have
come from Robinson than from another individual. 234 And the
punishment
facing
Robinson
if
convicted—the
death
penalty—exacerbated the devastating nature of the probability
determination. 235 During the course of Robinson’s defense, his
counsel requested access to the source code underlying TrueAllele,
claiming that, “without production and defense review of the
computer instructions, not only will the petitioner be denied his
constitutional right to a fair trial—he risks being wrongly
executed.” 236 Defense counsel explained that having access to the
source code was essential for cross-examining Mark Perlin,
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Seth Augenstein, Access Denied: Source Code for DNA Software
Remains Protected in Pa. Murder Trial, FORENSIC MAG. (Feb. 5, 2016),
https://perma.cc/G8TV-MRBG (last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
232. See id.; Dang, supra note 137.
233. See Augenstein, supra note 231; Dang, supra note 137.
234. Dang, supra note 137 (“TrueAllele found that the DNA was 5.6 billion
times more likely to belong to Robinson than to another suspect.”); Paula Reed
Ward, Attorneys Ask Superior Court to Take Up DNA Issue, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 8, 2016 (“Dr. Perlin said the DNA was 5.6 billion times more
likely to belong to Mr. Robinson.”). The TrueAllele analysis actually initially
produced a probability of one in 2 billion, but, after a software upgrade to the
program, it generated the one in 5.6 billion probability figure. See id.
235. See Dang, supra note 137 (“If Robinson is convicted, he faces the death
penalty.”).
236. Id.
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TrueAllele’s developer. 237 The district court was unpersuaded by
this argument, though, and denied the discovery request. 238 The
court stated that “[a]n order requiring Cybergenetics to produce
the source code would be unreasonable, as release would have the
potential to cause great harm to Cybergenetics.” 239 Indeed,
Cybergenetics could lose a lot of money to competitors if it made
the source code public.
Commercial PGS developers have generally sought to protect
their creations through secrecy, and many courts have granted
them this sphere of secrecy with respect to the programs’
algorithms and source codes. 240 Some courts have granted limited
access to this information in some circumstances, although these
orders have rarely endured. 241 For example, in March of 2018, a
237. See id.
238. See Augenstein, supra note 231; Dang, supra note 137.
239. Dang, supra note 137.
240. Some non-commercial developers make their source codes publicly
available, allowing researchers to modify and use their codes. See Kirchner, supra
note 42. As Lauren Kirchner has reported:
Some makers of probabilistic genotyping software allow other
programmers to use and modify their code. LRmix, software created by
a pair of scientists in the Netherlands, EuroForMix, created by a
Norwegian team, and Lab Retriever, a non-commercial program
available under the Creative Commons license and uploaded to
GitHub, are among the free, open-source tools available.
Beyond offering transparency, this approach can help expose problems.
A significant bug was discovered and fixed in LikeLTD, an open-source
Australian probabilistic genotyping program, because of outside
scrutiny.
Id.
241. As Professor Natalie Ram explained, as of 2018, “only one American
court ha[d] compelled production of the source code for probabilistic genotyping
software in a criminal case.” Ram, supra note 215, at 678; see also Imwinkelried,
supra note 178, at 101 (“The courts’ responses to requests for the source code of
TrueAllele has been even more uniformly negative than the previous requests for
access to the source codes of infrared breath testing instruments.”). And the
software at issue in that case was not developed by the commercial sector but was
instead created by New York City’s crime lab. See Lauren Kirchner, Federal
Judge Unseals New York Crime Lab’s Software for Analyzing DNA Evidence,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/4JJF-2JZT (last visited Jan. 21,
2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Experts had already
questioned the validity of FST’s design, but, after a judge ordered disclosure of
the software’s source code, one reviewing (defense) expert “found that the
program dropped valuable data from its calculations, in ways that users wouldn’t
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San Diego Superior Court judge ruled that prosecutors were
required to turn over STRmix’s software and source code to defense
counsel, 242 but the California Court of Appeals reversed this order
just a few months later. 243 Aside from court orders, certain
developers like Buckleton have made their source codes available
to defense counsel on a limited basis. 244 Such limited access could
require defense counsel to sign confidentiality and non-disclosure
agreements, though. 245 This could have the effect of limiting
counsel from critiquing the workings or accuracy of the program in
open court. 246 Less forthcoming, Cybergenetics provides
preliminary DNA results to law enforcement (as well as to defense
counsel) on a complimentary basis, charging the client for only a
full report that could be used as evidence at trial. 247

necessarily be aware of, but that could unpredictably affect the likelihood
assigned to the defendant’s DNA being in the mixture.” Lauren Kirchner, Traces
of Crime: How New York’s DNA Techniques Became Tainted, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4,
2017), https://perma.cc/DPN6-YMVZ (last visited Jan. 21, 2020) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). The expert concluded: “‘I did not leave with
the impression that FST was developed by an experienced software development
team,’” and that, “[p]ending more rigorous testing, ‘the correctness of the behavior
of the FST software should be seriously questioned.’” Id. Faced with these
concerns, the U.S. Attorney’s office withdrew the relevant DNA evidence against
the defendant prior to the admissibility hearing. See id.
242. See Greg Moran, DA Fights Judge’s Order to Hand Over Info on How
New DNA Test Works, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Apr. 16, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/25GS-8RMP (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
243. See People v. Superior Court, 239 Ca. Rptr. 3d 71 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
244. See Moran, supra note 242; Kevin Petroff, The Changing State of DNA
Analysis, 46 TEX. PROSEC. (July–Aug. 2016), https://perma.cc/6QR7-V8AQ (last
visited Jan. 20, 2020) (explaining that, although there are certainly “some
differences between [STRmix and TrueAllele], the biggest issue . . . is that the
STRmix creator is willing to share the ‘source code,’ or the ingredients of the
program, with the State or the defense if requested in a case,” while, “[a]t this
time, TrueAllele is refusing to provide that information”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
245. See Moran, supra note 242.
246. See id.
247. See Kirchner, supra note 42 (“[Cybergenetics] offers to take on [the] most
difficult DNA cases and provides preliminary results for free. . . . [C]ustomers
only pay at the point at which they want Cybergenetics to run a complete analysis
and write a report about the results that can be used at trial.”).
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Despite these concerns about accuracy and reliability, and
despite regularly being held secret, which heightens the validity
concerns, TrueAllele is used by crime labs in Virginia, Baltimore,
Kern County (CA), Beaufort County (SC), and Richland County
(SC). 248 STRmix is used by the FBI and U.S. Army, as well as labs
in New York, California, and Texas. 249
B. Burgeoning Secrecy in the Law
Secrecy has become a problem throughout the law 250 and is
especially troubling in the context of using computer programs in
the criminal justice system. Most often, criminal defendants do not
have access to the algorithms and source codes that criminal
justice system actors rely on in making impactful decisions about
these defendants’ lives. 251 In fact, it seems that even the
individuals wielding these programs—from police officers to
prosecutors to judges—do not have access to the details of the
programs upon which these important decisions are made. 252
Moreover, even if these actors did have access to the relevant
algorithms and source codes, they probably would not understand
their nuances, 253 as doing so would ordinarily require an
understanding of the applicable database, expertise in computer
science, and a background of conducting social or natural science

248. See id.
249. See id.; Petroff, supra note 244.
250. See, e.g., William W. Berry & Meghan J. Ryan, Cruel Techniques,
Unusual Secrets, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 405 (2017) (describing the problems of
secrecy surrounding lethal injection procedures under the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments).
251. See supra Part III.
252. See supra Parts III–IV.
253. See Ferguson, supra note 37, at 1166 (“The nature of algorithms further
obscures the process, except perhaps to technical experts.”).
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research. 254 As one might imagine, most criminal justice actors
lack these proficiencies. 255
One of the reasons that these algorithms and source codes are
kept secret is that outside companies have created them and rely
on this secrecy to make profits; the algorithms and source codes
are proprietary in nature. Northpointe’s COMPAS would not be
nearly as lucrative if its algorithm or source code were made public
and others could profit off of its research and development
investments. The same is true with respect to TrueAllele and other
technologies that the government uses to secure convictions. The
intricacies of intellectual property law exacerbate what has become
a secrecy problem in this arena. 256 In recent years it has become
more difficult to obtain effective patents on algorithms, pushing
businesses to heighten the secrecy surrounding their inventions
and operations rather than disclose information in exchange for a
temporary monopoly on the technology by way of patent law. 257
This is one factor that has contributed to the rise of secrecy in the
realm of government conviction programs.
But the secrecy surrounding the workings of technologies like
breathalyzers, AFISs, and PGSs is not entirely novel within the
criminal justice sphere. For example, in the area of lethal injection
there has also been a marked increase in secrecy as states have
had to experiment with a variety of drug cocktails to carry out
executions because European drug manufacturers have refused to
sell their drugs to buyers intending to use them to execute
254. Cf. id. (stating that “the technical complexity of [automated predictive
technologies’ designs] makes it nearly impossible for outsiders to determine the
accuracy, effectiveness, or fairness of the program” and explaining that, in the
context of predictive policing algorithms, although government actors “receive the
results, . . . due to the complexity of the chosen algorithm they can rarely
understand the underlying math”).
255. Cf. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEFENSE LAWYERS, GIDEON AT 50: A THREE-PART
EXAMINATION OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN AMERICA 9 (Oct. 2016) (examining the sorry
state of indigent defense in the United States today).
256. For a more detailed account of the intersection of intellectual property
and secret conviction programs, see Meghan J. Ryan, Secret Algorithms, IP
Rights, and the Public Interest (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
257. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014) (limiting
businesses’ abilities to obtain patents on computer software); see also Ryan, supra
note 256 (examining the interaction between intellectual property law and the
burgeoning secrecy in public law fields like criminal law and procedure).
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individuals. 258 In many instances, they have refused to disclose the
combinations of drugs to be used for execution, the dosages to be
used, and the drug suppliers. 259 This is in addition to the long
history of secrecy about the identity of the executioners and the
limitations on the numbers of individuals who may observe
executions. 260 Some litigants have objected to this secrecy, but they
have generally been unsuccessful due to the limitations of due
process and the confines of the particular procedural postures in
which these matters are raised. 261 Secrecy is also prevalent in the
258. See Berry & Ryan, supra note 250, at 422 (“[S]ecrecy has increasingly
crept into lethal injection executions. Today, state governments shroud modern
executions with multiple levels of secrecy, a disturbing notion in an open,
democratic society.”); see also Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth
Amendment Due Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1380–83 (2014) (chronicling states’
“increasingly creative and legally dubious steps to procure drugs for their
execution procedures”).
259. See Berry & Ryan, supra note 250, at 423 (“In many cases, states have
elected to keep the identity of the new drugs secret, as well as the names of the
drug manufacturers.”).
260. See id. (noting that the recent rise in secrecy around lethal injection
protocols “complements states’ traditional determinations to keep the identities
of executioners secret” and explaining that, “[n]ot only have executions
transitioned from the public to the private sphere, leaving most Americans
without the experience of watching someone die by lethal injection or firing squad,
but also gaining any access to the details of these executions is exceedingly
difficult, if not impossible”). There is at least one additional layer of secrecy with
respect to lethal injections. Id. at 406. This stems from the government’s use of a
paralytic to hide the corporal writhing that would likely otherwise be observed as
the death row offender is being put to death. See id. There seems to be no clinical
reason for this paralytic, which actually complicates the execution process by
making it more difficult to determine whether the offender has been sufficiently
sedated before he is killed. See Brief for Petitioners at 52, Baze v. Rees, No.
07-5439, 2007 WL 3307732 (Nov. 5, 2007) (stating that “[i]t is undisputed that
pancuronium is not a necessary component of the execution procedure” and
pointing out that the lower court “concluded that the ‘use of pancuronium in
Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol serves no therapeutic purpose’” (internal
alterations omitted)); Gregory D. Curfman et al., Physicians and Execution, 358
NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 403, 403 (2008) (“The use of a neuromuscular blocker,
pancuronium bromide, as part of the protocol has been especially controversial,
since it has no anesthetic properties and only paralyzes the person, which can
mask inadequate anesthesia if a sufficient dose of sodium thiopental has not been
administered.”).
261. See Berger, supra note 258, at 1392 (“The majority of courts, especially
federal appellate courts, have permitted states to keep secret important details
from their lethal injection procedures.”). In Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413
(5th Cir. 2013), for instance, the Fifth Circuit, rejecting the death row plaintiff’s
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area of government surveillance. After the terrorist attack on
September 11, 2001, and Congress’s enactment of the USA Patriot
Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court)
began issuing significantly broader secret subpoenas requiring
internet and telecommunications companies to surrender
customers’ personal data, browsing data, and details of their
conversations. 262 It also “began issuing ground-breaking secret
legal interpretations that allowed mass surveillance.” 263 All of this
was done in the name of national security. 264 Further, secrecy
abounds in terms of how the government obtains information to be
used against any particular defendant. As a result of the
“increasingly prevalent doctrine of ‘collective knowledge,’” which
means that one officer’s knowledge is imputed to other officers,
individual police officers can possess the necessary “reasonable
suspicion” to take actions in an effort to obtain evidence against a
suspect. 265 This allows police officers to obtain the information that
facilitates “parallel construction” in a case; 266 it enables the police
to obtain information from a secret source and then suggest that
the information came from another line of investigation. 267 All of
request that the state disclose the details of the execution protocol, concluded that
“[t]here is no violation of the Due Process Clause from the uncertainty that
Louisiana has imposed on Sepulvado by withholding the details of its execution
protocol.” Id. at 420. Provocatively, the court conceded that “[p]erhaps the state’s
secrecy masks ‘a substantial risk of serious harm’” stemming from the protocol,
“but,” the court furthered, “it does not create one.” Id. Defending its position, the
court pronounced that “[c]ourts are not supposed to function as ‘boards of inquiry
charged with determining best practices.’” Id. at 419 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 553
U.S. 35, 51 (2008) (plurality opinion)).
262. See US Foreign Intelligence Court Did Not Deny Any Surveillance
Requests Last Year, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/6FMZ-GSVT
(last visited Oct. 16, 2019) (discussing developments in government surveillance
in the post 9/11 era) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
263. ELIZABETH GOITEIN, THE NEW ERA OF SECRET LAW 6, 15 (2016),
https://perma.cc/HY6K-D3FW (PDF).
264. See id.
265. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DARK SIDE: SECRET ORIGINS OF EVIDENCE IN US
CRIMINAL CASES 37 (Jan. 9, 2018), https://perma.cc/C5N2-CCYE (last visited Oct.
16, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
266. Id.
267. See id. (“Through a practice known as parallel construction, an official
who wishes to keep an investigative activity hidden from courts and
defendants—and ultimately from the public—can simply go through the motions
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this obscures the true source of information against the defendant.
It has been defended as protecting the identities of vulnerable
confidential informants, though.
Whereas courts upholding the secrecy in these other contexts
have relied on the limitations of constitutional commands, the
confines of particular procedural postures, national security, and
protecting informants, courts upholding the secrecy in the
conviction algorithm context—at least to the extent that they have
been faced by these questions—have relied on the business
interests of the companies that developed the computer programs.
As the judge in the Robinson case 268 stated, “[a]n order requiring
Cybergenetics to produce the source code would be unreasonable,
as release would have the potential to cause great harm to
Cybergenetics.” 269 This is a questionable position when you
reframe the issue as one weighing the importance of accuracy in
criminal convictions against the importance of maintaining the
secrecy of technologies that the government has licensed to secure
convictions. This is not to suggest that the technology companies
should necessarily be required to publish the details of their
conviction programs, but perhaps there should be limitations on
the technologies that the government may use in convicting
individuals—especially when there are serious questions about the
accuracy and reliability of those technologies. Secrecy poses a
significant hurdle with respect to probing these questions of
accuracy and reliability.
C. Lay Acceptance and (Mis)Understanding of Science and
Technology
Intertwined with the motivations for secrecy is the general
lack of understanding of science and technology among lawyers.
Many lawyers have little understanding of science and the
intricacies of technology. 270 Like many Americans, most lawyers
of re-discovering evidence in some other way.” (internal quotations omitted)).
268. See supra notes 231–239 and accompanying text.
269. Dang, supra note 137.
270. See Garrett M. Graff, Government Lawyers Don’t Understand the
Internet. That’s a Problem, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2016, 11:48 AM),
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rely heavily on technology in their everyday lives with the use of
the internet, smartphones, and other gadgets. And in their law
practices, attorneys often rely on technology when working on
matters such as electronic discovery and DNA evidence. With this
heavy reliance on science and technology, but with little
understanding of it, the useful results in some ways seem like
magic. 271 Consumers of science and technology generally lack
understanding of the limits of science and technology. The same is
true with computer programs and their underlying algorithms and
source codes. Players within the criminal justice system frequently
rely on these programs, but they generally lack enough
understanding to fully comprehend the programs’ limitations. 272
Instead, like much science and technology that Americans
regularly encounter, criminal justice actors blindly trust these
products because they are in fact the products of science and
technology. 273 This trusted view of science and technology within
our system has become pervasive. Indeed, one commentator has
https://perma.cc/WMM4-5MUD (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) (“Both federal
prosecutors and the attorneys who represent executive agencies in court are
bungling lawsuits across the country because they don’t understand what they’re
talking about. Too few lawyers have the skill set or the specialized knowledge to
make sense of code, networks and the people who use them . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also James Podgers, Lawyers Still Have a
Lot to Learn About Technology, Ethics 20/20 Witnesses Say, ABA J. (Feb. 3, 2012,
2:12 AM), https://perma.cc/4E2P-46BU (last visited Oct. 30, 2019) (“Lawyers don’t
fully appreciate how much technology is changing the nature of law practice,
several witnesses said today at a public hearing conducted by the ABA
Commission on Ethics 20/20.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Ryan & Adams, supra note 63, at 1080 (stating that “the problems with
[reliability in various] areas of forensic science are exacerbated by generally poor
scientific understanding within the legal community, which has led many to
ascribe undue value to dubious evidence”).
271. See ARTHUR C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE
LIMITS OF THE POSSIBLE 21 n.1 (1962) (“Any sufficiently advanced technology is
indistinguishable from magic.”).
272. See Graff, supra note 270 (explaining how a changing world requires
greater understanding of technology but how lawyers, who are not sufficiently
trained in topics like coding, are troublingly deficient in this knowledge, leading
to “bungle[d] lawsuits,” “stymie[d] criminal investigations,” and “misappl[ied]
law”).
273. See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 1 (2009) (“The allure
of science has always captivated members of the legal profession. Its siren’s song
has followed us throughout much of American legal history.”).
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suggested that science has become the God of the criminal justice
system; judges and lawyers seem to venerate science more than
anything else in the system. 274
Because lawyers generally trust the results of science and
technology, and of criminal justice prediction and conviction
programs in particular, defense lawyers often do not even consider
challenging prosecutors’ reliance on these secret programs. There
have been some pockets of litigation related to the secrecy of these
algorithms and source codes—such as with breathalyzers and
PGSs 275—but not enough. Perhaps such challenges have been
stifled by the routine lack of success that challengers experience. 276
V. A Problem of Constitutional Proportions
The secrecy of the algorithms and source codes underlying
today’s many conviction programs should spark concern. The
dangers of this secrecy go beyond the criticisms levied against the
secrecy shrouding the details of the prediction programs used in
setting bail, sentencing, and making parole decisions. 277 Those
criticisms have generally focused on the programs’ reliance on
legally questionable and morally repugnant factors that
discriminate against minorities, and they have lightly touched on
the issues of accuracy and reliability as well. 278 With respect to
conviction programs, concerns about accuracy and reliability take
center stage, as false positives in this area could amount to fining,
incarcerating, or even killing innocent people. 279 Of course
concerns about relying on race and its proxies, or other
unacceptable factors, remain troubling, but accuracy and
reliability are paramount here. And one cannot satisfactorily
determine accuracy and reliability when secrecy cloaks the
algorithms and source codes underlying these conviction
274. See id. at 119 (“Perhaps the greatest irony . . . is the place of honor and
worship to which science has ascended.”).
275. See supra Parts IV.A.1, 3.
276. See supra Parts IV.A.1, 3.
277. See supra Part II.
278. See supra Part II.D.
279. See supra notes 154–156 and accompanying text.
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programs. However, in many cases, for-profit companies have
created the programs prosecutors regularly employ. 280 It is not
surprising, then, that these companies want to maintain the
secrecy surrounding their products so that they may continue to
earn profits off of them. While this makes sense from the
company’s perspective, it creates problems when prosecutors use
these programs within the criminal justice system. If the programs
remain secret, how can researchers or defendants independently
test them for consistency and accuracy? If judges, prosecutors, or
the companies themselves refuse to lift the veil of secrecy, how can
defendants effectively challenge these programs, which may very
well be the basis not just for a defendant’s denial of bail, long
sentence, or denial of parole, but for the defendant’s conviction?
Although defendants generally have access to the results of their
computer-based assessments, the details of the algorithm and
underlying source code that computed it are generally withheld. 281
This secrecy poses a problem under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution, which provide that criminal
defendants are entitled to due process of law prior to conviction
and punishment. 282 Defendants’ due process rights are in some
regards quite broad, but defining the scope of these rights is
sometimes difficult and requires a bit of interpretation. 283 In
various areas of due process jurisprudence, courts have applied
slightly different tests to determine whether there has been a due
process violation. For example, in determining whether the
prosecution has unfairly withheld exculpatory information, a court
280. See supra Part IV.A.
281. See Angwin et al., supra note 42; see also supra Part III (describing
various conviction algorithms and touching on the secrecy enveloping these
various cocoons surrounding the technologies employed to secure convictions).
282. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No
State . . . shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”).
283. See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 1, 14 (2006) (explaining that “[t]he body of criminal due process
precedents is highly protective of defendants in many regards” but that, “[a]t the
same time, due process hearing rights that are routine in the pretrial stages of
civil cases can be absent from parallel stages of the criminal process, despite the
comparable or greater interests at stake”).
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assesses
whether
the
withheld
information
was
material—whether there is a reasonable probability that
disclosing it would have made a difference in the outcome at
trial. 284 In the context of pre-trial publicity, the U.S. Supreme
Court has held that a defendant’s due process rights have been
violated if a media circus may have, or actually did, infect the jury
in the charging venue. 285 Common to the Court’s due process cases
in the criminal justice arena, though, is reliance on several values
supported by this constitutional right. 286 The various
constitutional values embedded in and at the core of the Court’s
due process cases include “adversarial testing, truth-finding,

284. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (plurality opinion)
(“The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.”); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now
hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
285. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 398–99 (2010) (stating that
“[j]urors . . . need not enter the box with empty heads in order to determine the
facts impartially,” explaining that “[i]t is sufficient if the jurors can lay aside their
impressions or opinions and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in
court,” and concluding that “Skilling failed to establish that a presumption of
prejudice arose or that actual bias infected the jury that tried him” (internal
quotations and alterations omitted)); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358
(1966) (“The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided since the
courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the
court. . . . [T]he presence of the press at judicial proceedings must be limited when
it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged.”);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726 (1963) (“[I]t was a denial of due
process . . . to refuse the request for a change of venue, after the people of
Calcasieu Parish had been exposed repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of
Rideau personally confessing in detail to the crimes with which he was later to be
charged.”); see also Jordan Gross, If Skilling Can’t Get a Change of Venue, Who
Can? Salvaging Common Law Implied Bias Principles from the Wreckage of the
Constitutional Pretrial Publicity Standard, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 575, 582–615 (2013)
(chronicling the evolution of the Court’s pretrial publicity jurisprudence).
286. See Ryan, supra note 145, at 421 (“Beyond the constitutional provisions
themselves, though, the Court regularly relies on at least four important
constitutional criminal procedural values. These are the values of adversarial
testing, truth-finding, dignity, and equality.”).
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dignity, and equality.” 287 Each of these values is important to
preserving criminal defendants’ due process rights. 288
This constitutional right of due process encompasses a number
of more specific rights, including the right to a fair trial, the right
to be provided with exculpatory evidence known by the
government, the right to present a defense, and the right to have
access to resources to make out a defense. 289 In its 1973 case of
Chambers v. Mississippi, 290 the Court explained that “[t]he right of
an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right
to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.” 291
In Chambers, this meant that the state’s evidentiary rules
preventing the defendant from admitting into evidence the many
confessions to the crime made by another individual
unconstitutionally deprived the defendant of his due process
rights. 292 More recently, in its 2006 case of Holmes v. South
Carolina, 293 the Court reiterated the principle espoused in
Chambers, stating that “the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.’” 294 There, the Court held that the defendant’s due process
rights were violated when the state court refused to admit evidence
that another individual confessed to the crime because, according
to the state court, this evidence failed to “raise[] a reasonable
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76, 86–87 (1985) (explaining that
the Due Process Clause requires courts to “take steps to assure that the defendant
has a fair opportunity to present his defense,” which in this case meant providing
the defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist); see also In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 273 (1948) (stating that “a person’s right to reasonable notice of a charge
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to his day in
court—are basic in our system of jurisprudence” and that “these rights include,
as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony,
and to be represented by counsel”).
290. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
291. Id. at 294.
292. See id. at 302 (“We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence,
coupled with the State’s refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine [the
confessor], denied him a trial in accord with traditional and fundamental
standards of due process.”).
293. 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
294. Id. at 324 (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)).
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inference as to the defendant’s own innocence” 295 and instead
“merely cast[] a bare suspicion or raise[d] a conjectural inference
as to another’s guilt.” 296 Invoking the constitutional right to
present one’s defense under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme
Court explained that, while states “have broad latitude . . . to
establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials, . . . the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense,’” 297 which limits states’
rulemaking powers. 298 When a state promulgates rules that
“infringe upon [this] weighty interest of the accused,” 299 it risks
depriving the defendant of this important right. 300
The Court has even extended this right to present a defense to
include providing indigent defendants with the resources to do so.
In Ake v. Oklahoma, 301 the Court explained that the “due process
guarantee of fundamental fairness . . . derives from the belief that
justice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty, a
defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in
a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.” 302
Accordingly, if a defendant cannot afford the tools necessary to
meaningfully present his defense, the government “must take
steps to assure that [he] has a fair opportunity” to do so.” 303 The
Court has applied this principle to provide defendants with copies
of their district court transcripts, 304 waive the fee to file for

295. Id. at 323.
296. Id. at 323–24.
297. Id. at 324.
298. See id. (stating that states’ latitude “to establish rules excluding evidence
from criminal trials . . . has limits”).
299. Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324.
300. Id.
301. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
302. Id. at 76.
303. Id.
304. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956); see also Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985) (relying on the Griffin case as partial precedent for the
decision).
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appeal, 305 provide defendants with effective assistance of
counsel, 306 and the assistance of a psychiatrist. 307
The constitutional right to be provided the opportunity to
present a complete defense is closely related to the Confrontation
Clause right firmly embedded in the Sixth Amendment 308 and
recently expounded on by the Court in Crawford v. Washington 309
and its progeny. In Crawford, the Court clarified that the
Confrontation Clause requires that out-of-court statements that
are testimonial in nature be inadmissible at trial unless “the
declarant was unavailable to testify . . . and the defendant had had
a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 310 In Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts 311 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 312 the Court built
on this groundbreaking case to establish that, even when a party
presents forensic testimony at trial, the author of the relevant
forensic report must also testify at trial. 313 Referencing these same
305. See Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959); see also Ake, 470 U.S. at 76
(relying on Burns as partial precedent for the decision).
306. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1963); see also Ake, 470 U.S. at 76 (relying on
Burns as partial precedent for the decision).
307. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 86–87 (“We therefore conclude that Ake also was
entitled to the assistance of a psychiatrist on this issue and that the denial of that
assistance deprived him of due process.”).
308. The Sixth Amendment provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
309. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
310. Id. at 53–54, 68. The Court also noted that this rule “does not bar the use
of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the
matter asserted . . . .” Id. at 59 n.9; see also Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012)
(plurality opinion) (stating that “Crawford . . . took pains to reaffirm the
proposition that the Confrontation Clause ‘does not bar the use of testimonial
statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter
asserted”’).
311. 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
312. 564 U.S. 647 (2011).
313. See id. at 651–52 (concluding that live testimony of a forensic analyst
who did not perform the relevant forensic testing was insufficient to meet the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause); Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307, 329
(holding that “affidavits reporting the results of forensic analysis which shows
that material seized by the police and connected to the defendant was cocaine”
constituted testimonial statements, which rendered them inadmissible under the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and Crawford because the declarant was
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ideas, the Holmes Court 314 noted that the right to have a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense could be
rooted in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment in
addition to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clauses. 315 In fact, even in Chambers—which the Court decided
long before the Crawford case—the Court found that “[t]he rights
to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in
one’s own behalf have long been recognized as essential to due
process.” 316
Defendants’ inabilities to gain access to information that may
be essential to presenting a complete defense thus poses a
significant constitutional concern under both the Due Process
Clauses and the Confrontation Clause. Pursuant to the Due
Process Clauses, greater information about the algorithms and
source codes underlying the computer programs generating
breathalyzer, fingerprint, and DNA evidence against criminal
defendants could very well be crucial to these defendants’ defenses.
Without access to this information, criminal defendants are denied
the “fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations” to
not unavailable and the defense had not had the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant). The Court muddied the waters somewhat when it determined in
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012), that there was no Confrontation Clause
defect when the prosecution’s expert relied on the report of an outside
laboratory—a report that developed a DNA profile of a rapist from the victim’s
vaginal swabs—to conclude that the defendant’s DNA profile matched the DNA
profile developed by the outside laboratory. See generally Williams v. Illinois, 567
U.S. 50 (2012). Although five Justices voted in favor of not finding a Confrontation
Clause problem, they could not agree on the reasoning. As Justice Kagan
explained in dissent, the Williams case “left significant confusion in [its] wake.”
Id. at 141. It now seems that Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming “no longer mean all
that they say,” but “no one can tell in what way or to what extent they are altered
because no proposed limitation commands the support of a majority.” Id. Justice
Kagan (along with Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor) thus concluded
that, “until a majority of th[e] Court reverses or confines those decisions, [one
should] understand them as continuing to govern, in every particular, the
admission of forensic evidence.” Id.
314. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
315. See id. at 324 (“Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clauses
of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” (quoting Crane v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986))).
316. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
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which Chambers and Holmes held they are entitled.” 317 At the
same time, withholding this information about the underlying
algorithms and computer source codes violates the related
Confrontation Clause. 318 The State is presenting testimonial
information—whether that be in the form of breathalyzer,
fingerprint, DNA, or other evidence—against the defendant
without allowing the defendant to truly confront the witnesses
against him as the Sixth Amendment requires. 319 The forensic
examiner in these cases is not the true witness, or at least not the
only witness, against the defendant. Instead, the forensic
examiner is relying heavily on the conviction program’s underlying
algorithm and source code in concluding that the defendant’s blood
or breath alcohol content is at a particular level, that his
fingerprint is a match to the one left on the murder weapon, or that
his DNA matches the DNA left at the crime scene. 320 Often, the
forensic examiner is not even entirely aware of how the algorithm
and source code reach their results. 321 Instead, the examiner may
understand only how he must set up the test and how to interpret
the results reached by the algorithm and source code embedded in
the computer program. Cross-examination may thus reveal the
examiner’s mistakes, incompetency, or even fraud, 322 but the
317. Id. at 294; see also Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324 (stating that “the
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.’” (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690
(1986))).
318. Professor Andrea Roth has argued that “[a]llowing the state to build or
harness machines to render accusations, without also providing the defendant a
constitutional right to test the credibility of those machine sources, resembles
trial by ex parte affidavit”—one of the primary concerns that animated the
drafting and ratification of the Confrontation Clause. See Roth, supra note 113,
at 2041, 2043.
319. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing that, “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him”); see also supra notes 308–316 and accompanying text
(explaining how the Court has interpreted the Sixth Amendment in Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) and its progeny). Some scholars disagree, though,
on whether machines, themselves, are “witnesses” under the language of the
Sixth Amendment. See Roth, supra note 113, at 2040.
320. See supra Parts III.A.1–2.
321. See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
322. See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. 647, 661–62 (2011) (explaining that
confrontation was necessary to “expose any lapses or lies on the certifying
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examiner would not be able to sufficiently answer any questions
the defense might pose related to how the conviction program
reached its conclusions. And any answer the examiner might
espouse would likely be based on training materials provided to
him—statements provided by the creator of the test—which likely
would not divulge details about the proprietary algorithm or source
code. Such examiner statements would be insufficient to meet the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment as explained by Crawford
and its progeny. 323
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming, requiring additional expert testimony on the part of
the prosecution could pose practical problems. In those cases, the
Court was addressing the prosecution’s concerns that requiring
forensic examiners to testify to the results of drug analyses and
blood tests would be overly burdensome. 324 The Court, however,
explained that constitutional requirements like those imposed by
the Confrontation Clause “may not disregard [such constitutional
provisions] at our convenience,” 325 and only a small percentage of
cases proceed to trial anyway, significantly reducing the burden
alleged by the prosecution. 326 Attempting to mitigate such possible
analyst’s part”); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009)
(“Confrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the
incompetent one as well. Serious deficiencies have been found in the forensic
evidence used in criminal trials.”).
323. The prosecution could potentially circumvent the Confrontation Clause
requirements by calling an expert to testify about a matter and, in doing so,
relying on and referring to a secret conviction program’s output. See generally
Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012) (plurality opinion) (finding no
constitutional defect in a similar circumstance). In Williams v. Illinois, the Court
found no violation of the Confrontation Clause in a similar situation, either
because the expert’s reference to the underlying report was not offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, or because the reference, had it been admitted
for that purpose, was not testimonial in nature. See id. at 57–59. A majority of
the Justices could not agree on the reasoning for the decision, leaving the
precedential value of the case unclear. See id. at 141 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
324. See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 665; Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325.
325. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325; see Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 665 (quoting
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325).
326. See Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 667; see also Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325.
Further, the Court stated that “[p]erhaps the best indication that the sky will not
fall [when enforcing the Confrontation Clause] . . . is that it has not done so
already.
Many
States
have
already
adopted
the
constitutional
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inconveniences in the evidentiary context, a number of states have
addressed the issue of the accuracy and reliability of conviction
program software and outputs through statutes and rules
concluding that particular tools, and their underlying source codes
and algorithms, are admissible at trial without a predicate
showing of their validity in each case. 327 In Underdahl, for
example, a relevant state statute provided that “the results of a
breath test, when performed by a person who has been fully
trained in the use of an . . . approved breath-testing
instrument, . . . are admissible in evidence without antecedent
expert testimony that . . . [the] instrument provides a trustworthy
and reliable measure of the alcohol in the breath.” 328 And pursuant
to a state rule, the relevant breathalyzer was approved for use
statewide. 329 State procedures authorizing particular instruments,
though, are far from transparent, and, as the litigation related to
the Underdahl case demonstrates, states have approved
instruments that do indeed produce inaccurate results, at least in
some circumstances. 330 Further, prior authorization via statute or
rule does not resolve the Confrontation Clause matter. A defendant
is still being tried based on secret algorithms and source codes, and
he is not being given the opportunity to ask questions and receive
answers from individuals who have knowledge about this secret
material; he thus lacks an opportunity to sufficiently confront
witnesses against him and defend against this inculpatory
evidence. As Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming made clear, whether
compliance with the constitutional requirements creates burdens
for the state does not justify disregarding the constitutional rules.
rule . . . announce[d]” in Melendez-Diaz. Melendez Diaz, 557 U.S. at 325.
327. See Imwinkelried, supra note 178, at 112 (explaining that, “[u]nless the
court invalidates the statute on some constitutional ground, the[se] statute[s]
eliminate[] the need for the prosecution to present any foundational testimony
about the empirical validity of the technique”).
328. MINN. STAT. § 634.16.
329. See Minn. R. 7502.0420, subpart 3 (repealed).
330. See In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters,
816 N.W.2d 525, 536 (Minn. 2012) (referencing “[t]he district court[’s]
determin[ation] . . . that the source code of the instrument did impact the
reliability of Intoxilyzer 5000EN instruments that reported a ‘deficient sample’
while running the 240 software”).
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In addition to the primary concerns related to a defendant’s
opportunity to make a complete defense and to confront witnesses
against him, the secrecy surrounding today’s secret conviction
programs raises some questions under the doctrine flowing from
the Supreme Court’s case of Brady v. Maryland331 and the
disclosure obligations under various jurisdictions’ discovery rules.
Brady and its progeny provide that a defendant’s due process
rights are violated if the prosecution withholds exculpatory or
impeachment evidence favorable to the accused if that evidence
was material—if “its suppression undermines confidence in the
outcome of the trial.” 332 Beyond just the relevant exculpatory
material within its own possession or knowledge, though, the
prosecution is charged with disclosing exculpatory material within
the knowledge of agents acting on its behalf, such as police officers
and forensic examiners. 333 Translating this doctrine to the
employment of PGSs in criminal cases illustrates the difficulties
that these conviction programs create. If a PGS acts on behalf of
the prosecution in analyzing a DNA mixture to determine the
relative likelihoods that the defendant was a contributor to the
331. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
332. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674–78 (1985) (“Consistent
with ‘our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt,’ a
constitutional error occurs, and the conviction must be reversed, only if the
evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in
the outcome of the trial.”); Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (“We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
333. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)
[T]he prosecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed, must be
assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of
all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of “reasonable
probability” is reached. This in turn means that the individual
prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the
others acting on the government’s behalf in the case, including the
police.
See also John v. People, S. Ct. Crim. No. 2014-0030, 2015 WL 5622212, at *5 (V.I.
Sept. 24, 2015) (“The prosecutor is presumed to have knowledge of all relevant
and material information within the actual knowledge and possession of other
agencies outside of the prosecutor’s office where these agencies have collaborated
with the prosecution as . . . part of the investigative team, such as the police
department or forensic lab.”).
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sample versus another individual, then the prosecution should be
charged with the potentially exculpatory and impeachment
evidence buried in the PGS’s algorithms and source codes. But
without transparency between at least the PGS developer and the
prosecution, the prosecutor is not in a position to fulfill his
constitutional and ethical duties with respect to disclosure. Where
state discovery rules require the prosecution to maintain an open
file, 334 similar logic indicates that the prosecution should provide
the accused with information on the conviction programs’
algorithms and source codes.
Ultimately, defendants’ due process and confrontation rights
suggest that the algorithms and source codes underlying secret
conviction programs should be disclosed. It is only with access to
this information that defendants and their counsel and experts can
examine whether the evidence used against them is valid. There
are a variety of ways by which transparency could be achieved, and
it would not necessarily have to jeopardize the business interests
of the companies producing these important technologies. 335
Indeed, the government could provide this information under seal
or pursuant to a protective order; 336 or, perhaps more
appropriately, the companies could include the value of disclosure
in their bargains with the government to use the programs or use
334. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903 (“Upon motion of the defendant,
the court must order . . . [t]he State to make available to the defendant the
complete files of all law enforcement agencies, investigatory agencies, and
prosecutors’ offices involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the
prosecution of the defendant.”); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 39.14
Subject to [certain] restrictions . . . as soon as practicable after
receiving a timely request from the defendant the state shall produce
and permit the inspection of any . . . documents . . . that constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and that
are in the possession, custody, or control of the state or any person
under contract with the state.
335. In fact, as Professor Edward Imwinkelried has explained, a company’s
exposure risk for the wrongful disclosure of a trade secret is small in the context
of disclosure pursuant to a criminal prosecution. See Imwinkelried, supra note
178, at 127–28. The risk is much higher when a company is ordered to disclose a
trade secret to its competitors—those “with economic interests directly adverse to
those of the owner of the trade secret.” Id. at 128.
336. For a discussion of how parties have disclosed trade secrets pursuant to
protective orders and other protective measures in different types of cases, see id.
at 125–28.
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the resulting analyses in court. The government could perhaps pay
a premium for an exclusive license to the software. Whatever the
method, only greater transparency can satisfy defendants’
constitutional guarantees.
A courtroom may not be the best crucible in which to
determine the accuracy and reliability of these types of technology.
Experts, rather than lay judges and jurors, could very likely reach
more reliable conclusions on this subject of accuracy. And defense
lawyers would most certainly welcome peer review of the various
conviction programs. But, while accuracy and reliability are crucial
here, they are not the only priority. Rather, the constitutional
rights of individual defendants are equally, if not more,
important. 337 And courtrooms are the proper venues for jealously
guarding these rights. While truth-finding has increasingly
become the predominant value in discussions across the criminal
justice system, we should not let this goal blind us from other
important interests. As William Blackstone once said, it is “better
that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” 338
Even in the world of high-powered DNA analysis, absolute
certainty of truth—and thus absolute certainty of whether a
defendant is guilty—is generally unobtainable. 339 We can achieve
probabilities and likelihoods, but absolute certainty is difficult. 340
In wading into the statistics involved in determining the likelihood
of a defendant’s guilt, it is important to safeguard the principle
that the risk of wrongful conviction should weigh heavier than the
risk of wrongful exoneration.
337. See Ryan, supra note 145, at 433 (“[T]here are values beyond just
truth-finding that should not be forgotten. Just like we sacrifice truth for the sake
of privacy when a judge excludes probative evidence that was found in violation
of the Fourth Amendment, values such as dignity remain important even aside
from their relationship to truth.”); see also supra notes 286–288 and
accompanying text (explaining that the constitutional values of “adversarial
testing, truth-finding, dignity, and equality” are “embedded in and at the core of
the Court’s due process cases”).
338. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352; see also Alexander Volokh,
N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997) (exploring the “Blackstone ratio” of
ten to one).
339. See Ryan, supra note 145, at 429 (“Despite our advances in science and
technology, truth may be difficult to come by. And certainty of truth is generally
impossible.”).
340. See id. at 429.
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VI. Conclusion

Commentators have paid significant attention to the
algorithms, and maybe even the source codes, underlying
computerized prediction programs that judges and parole boards
have used to aid in setting bail, sentencing, and determining
whether to release offenders from prison. These programs deserve
this attention because they are potentially based on illegal or
morally repugnant discriminators like race and because there are
real, and often overlooked, questions about the accuracy and
reliability of these programs. But even more concerning are the
secret conviction programs that prosecutors are quietly using to
secure convictions in criminal cases. Judges, prosecutors, and the
businesses that developed these programs have generally refused
to disclose the details of the algorithms and source codes powering
these conviction programs, and this secrecy raises real
constitutional concerns. Defendants’ due process and confrontation
rights entitle them to have meaningful opportunities to present
full defenses and to confront the witnesses against them. But,
without transparency of the algorithms and source codes
embedded in the conviction programs, defendants cannot truly
probe the evidence presented against them. They lack the
opportunity to investigate whether the algorithms are sound, the
source codes are error-free, and the programs produce accurate
and reliable results. They also lack the opportunity to
cross-examine individuals who truly know the inner workings of
the programs to again determine accuracy and reliability.
Transparency is thus necessary to protect these defendants’
constitutional rights.

